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“HACKING” SERVICE OF PROCESS: USING SOCIAL MEDIA TO 





On a fundamental level, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause requires that a defendant be provided with adequate notice of any 
proceeding to be accorded finality.1 Since the Supreme Court announced the 
modern standard for determining the constitutionality of notice in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Co.,2 there have been many opportunities for 
courts to determine whether newly conceived methods of service of process 
are constitutionally sufficient. Entirely new means of communication have 
been created and put into widespread use.3 As people have changed the way 
they interact with each other and how they receive information, service 
methods once perceived to be effective ways to communicate notice seem 
less so.4 
As our society has changed, we have witnessed revised application of 
the principles of due process to court procedures. For example, personal 
jurisdiction changed from a highly formalistic inquiry, focused on whether a 
defendant was located within the territorial authority of a state,5 to a more 
pragmatic inquiry focused on fairness and due process rights.6 Similar to the 
evolution of the personal jurisdiction standard, the notice requirement has 
been stretched since the time of Mullane as new communication tools such 
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and to Jayci Noble and Tess Shubert, for their valuable research assistance. Finally, thank 
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 1. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 2. Id. at 314–315. 
 3. See Trisha Dowerah Baruah, Effectiveness of Social Media as a tool of communica-
tion and its potential for technology enabled connections: A micro-level study, 2 INT’L J. OF 
SCI. & RES. PUBLICATIONS 1, 8–9 (2012) (discussing the impact of social media on the way 
people communicate and process information). 
 4. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process). 
 5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877). 
 6. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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as television, telex, and fax became available.7 What makes the current envi-
ronment unique is the speed at which human communication is changing.8 
Never before has communication changed so quickly and in a way accessi-
ble to the general public. Television and fax, while revolutionary in the way 
they permitted people to send and access information, were largely tools that 
few people had the ability to harness for purposes of notice.9 Social media, 
by contrast, is a free medium, and the user can both receive and send infor-
mation. Additionally, when coupled with the advancement of inexpensive 
mobile devices and ready access to the internet, individuals can access so-
cial media tools wherever they go.10 The widespread accessibility of these 
new technologies has radically altered the way in which people send and 
receive information.11 
Plaintiffs have long advocated for more efficient means of service of 
process when a defendant attempts to evade service or when service of pro-
cess through in-hand personal service would be too expensive or impracti-
cal. While in-hand personal service will remain the gold standard service of 
process method, social media provides new avenues for achieving constitu-
tionally sufficient notice. As such, service rules should be adopted that pro-
vide plaintiffs with a default option of service via social media while ensur-
ing defendants’ constitutional rights are adequately protected. Additionally, 
service rules should be adopted that permit the court to order service via 
social media after considering the individual circumstances of the case. Fi-
nally, service rules should be adopted that facilitate securing the defendant’s 
consent to service via social media. 
This article explores the principles underlying the notice requirement 
of the
 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.12 Against this backdrop, 
this article examines the unique challenges presented by service via social 
media.13 This article proposes several legislative options that permit service 
 
 7. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process). 
 8. See NICK COULDRY, MEDIA, SOCIETY, WORLD: SOCIAL THEORY AND DIGITAL MEDIA 
PRACTICE 1-30 (2012) (discussing the impact of recent changes in the use of media on socie-
ty), Baruah, supra note 3, at 4. 
 9. For example, while many people own television sets, most people cannot afford to 
purchase television airtime. Therefore, for this medium, the messaging is only transmitted 
one way. 
 10. A 2015 Pew Research Center Report found that “68% of U.S. adults have a 
smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and tablet computer ownership has edged up to 45% 
among adults.” Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 
2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/. Addi-
tionally, “86% of those ages 18-29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those ages 30-49 and 
87% of those living in households earning $75,000 and up annually.” Id. 
 11. See Baruah, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 12. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of notice jurisprudence in the U.S.); see 
also infra Part III (discussing the principles underlying the due process notice requirement). 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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of process on individual defendants14 via social media,15 while upholding the 
principles of due process and ensuring constitutional notice is provided to 
the defendant. Ultimately, social media provides an efficient “legal hack”16 
because, for some defendants, it is more likely to provide notice than other, 
more traditional, methods of service. 
II. THE HISTORY OF NOTICE AND SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
This section explores the evolution of the due process right to notice in 
the American legal system. After addressing the basic attributes of notice,17 
this section addresses the various methods for service of process that have 
been adopted to accomplish notice and the constitutional analysis of these 
methods.18 Interwoven in this section is an evaluation of the impact that 
technological advances in communication have made on service of process. 
Finally, this section compares the methods for service of process embraced 
in the United States with service methods currently being used abroad.19 
A. The Basic Components of Notice 
To enter a binding judgment against a defendant, he must be properly 
notified of the claims against him.20 Notice is proper only when the method 
 
 14. This article is limited to a discussion of the service of process on individual defend-
ants in civil actions. While service of process via social media on a corporation or entity 
would, in some cases, pass constitutional muster, the pattern of use of social media by indi-
viduals differs from that of entities. This article focuses on the use of social media by indi-
viduals and argues for service rules built around these patterns of behavior. Additionally, this 
article does not address service of process in class actions. 
 15. This article focuses on the use of social media by individuals and recommends ser-
vice rules premised on the communication supported by social media platforms. This article 
does not take a larger position on whether other forms of electronic communication, such as 
email, can or should be used for service of process. However, the reasoning in this article 
could be used to support more generalized service provisions aimed at all forms of electronic 
service of process. 
 16. “Legal hacking” is a cultural reference to the growing movement to find creative 
solutions to problems that lie at the intersection of law and technology. “Legal hackers spot 
issues and opportunities where technology can improve and inform the practice of law and 
where law, legal practice, and policy can adapt to rapidly changing technology.” LEGAL 
HACKERS, www. https://legalhackers.org/ (last visited June 28, 2016). “Legal hacking” was 
the focus of the UALR Bowen School of Law’s Ben J. Altheimer Symposium at which this 
paper was presented. 
 17. See infra Section II.A. 
 18. See infra Section II.B. 
 19. See infra Section II.C. 
 20. While more than just proper notice is needed for a binding judgment, notice is an 
essential part of ensuring that the defendant will be bound to the court’s judgment. Mullane v. 
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for service of process21 is authorized by the jurisdiction and the service is 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. A de-
fendant who fails to appear after receiving proper notice will have a default 
judgment entered against him.22 However, without proper notice, that judg-
ment will be subject to collateral attack.23 
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the Supreme Court 
announced the modern-day test for the right to notice under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.24 Under Mullane, notice must be “reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of 
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”25 At a minimum, “the notice must be of such nature as reasona-
bly to convey the required information” including the court where the action 
is pending, the date by which the defendant must respond, and the conse-
quences for failure to respond.26 Moreover, the notice “must afford a reason-
able time for those interested to make their appearance.”27 Finally, the meth-
od for notice must amount to more than a “mere gesture;” rather, “[t]he 
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”28 When such notice is 
impossible or is not practicable, “the form chosen [must] not [be] substan-
tially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and custom-
ary substitutes.”29 Like other individual due process rights, the defendant 
may waive his right to receive notice or may consent to a particular form of 
notice.30 
 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET 
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1074 (4th ed. 2016). 
 21. In this Article, the term “service of process” will refer generally to the service initiat-
ing the lawsuit. In some jurisdictions, this includes service of the complaint and a summons. 
This also be accomplished through the service of a notice, writ or other order. See Majorie A. 
Shields, Annotation, Service of Process Via Computer or Fax, 30 A.L.R.6th 413 (2008). 
 22. WRIGHT, supra, note 20. 
 23. Id.; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 24. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. While other procedural due process challenges have fol-
lowed the balancing test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976), 
the Court held in Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167–68 (2002), that the Mullane 
standard was applicable in determining whether notice was constitutional. 
 25. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. Because a civil court proceeding that will bind the de-
fendant constitutes a deprivation of his constitutional right to property, the due process clause 
is triggered. Id at 313.; see also WRIGHT, supra, note 20;8 RHONDA WASSERMAN, 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 22-
61 (Jack Stark ed., 2004) (discussing the components of procedural due process analysis). 
 26. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. 
 27. Id. at 314. 
 28. Id. at 315. 
 29. Id. 
 30. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 288 (2016). Of course, a court may also consider the 
sufficiency of service sua sponte. Id. Other groups of vulnerable defendants may be protected 
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Applying Mullane, the Court has clarified that actual notice is not con-
stitutionally required.31 It has been accepted practice, following Mullane, 
when the defendant has actual notice, courts are often willing to overlook 
technical defects in performance of service.32 
B. The Methods of Service of Process Employed by State and Federal 
Courts 
While state laws authorize a variety of methods for service of process 
on individuals, and even vary in the operation of those methods, there are 
several common categories of approved service methods that exist across 
jurisdictions. This section will examine traditional methods of service used 
in both state and federal courts33 before exploring new and emerging author-
ized methods for service of process. 
1. Traditional Methods of Service of Process 
a. In-Hand Personal Service of Process 
In-hand personal service of process has always been considered a con-
stitutional method of service and is commonly referred to as the “gold 
standard” method.34 As such, every jurisdiction authorizes in-hand personal 
 
from consent to less formal methods of service. Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to 
Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social Networking Sites to Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J. 
(Oct. 1, 2011 8:49AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/our_pleasure_to_serve_ 
lawyers_social_networking_sites_notify_defendants/ (discussing how some jurisdictions 
might limit the ability to contract away the right to formal service of process in property 
leases). 
 31. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 169–170 (2002). 
 32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 2 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.1982) (noting 
that “in most jurisdictions the statutory provisions on notice-giving have gradually been 
revised and reinterpreted to require less exacting compliance with technical formality. How-
ever, the statutes still may be construed as establishing a set of requirements as to notice-
giving effort that go beyond those imposed by the Constitution.”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 3 cmt. b (AM LAW INST.1982) (noting that “[t]he modern approach 
to notice-giving attaches primary importance to actual notice and treats technical compliance 
with notice procedures as a secondary consideration”). 
 33. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide a discrete list of approved 
methods for service of process on an individual located in the United States. FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(e). In addition to these methods, the FRCP incorporates any method authorized by the state 
in which the case is filed or in which the defendant is served. Id. at 4(e)(1). Therefore, any 
alteration made to the state service laws will automatically have some impact on the federal 
courts. 
 34. WASSERMAN, supra note 25, at 130; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that “[p]ersonal service of written notice within the jurisdiction 
is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding.”). 
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service of process on an individual defendant. It has become widely 
acknowledged as synonymous with notice, so much so that it has become an 
event engrained in our cultural experience and is often depicted in movies or 
television shows.35 
To accomplish in-hand personal service, the plaintiff must employ an 
authorized server. Some jurisdictions limit servers to the sheriff (or other 
state official) or to a licensed server,36 while other jurisdictions only require 
that the server be an individual over eighteen-years-old who is not a party to 
the suit.37 While all jurisdictions require in-hand service be made to the de-
fendant personally,38 some states place limits on where or when service may 
be made.39 Finally, service is considered valid even if the defendant ulti-
mately does not accept the process papers from the server. Courts have up-
held service on a defendant who refused to take physical possession of the 
summons when the defendant was clearly apprised of the contents of the 
process and the process papers are left near him or in a space he physically 
controls.40 
For the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in-hand personal service of 
process was used in all cases where the court exercised in personam juris-
diction over the defendant.41 However, following the landmark Supreme 
Court decision of International Shoe Co. v. Washington,42 in-hand personal 
service of process was no longer required to maintain personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant.43 Rather, in personam personal jurisdiction was estab-
lished if the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.44 
When in-hand service of process was no longer necessary to achieve in per-
 
 35. Ronald J. Hedges et al., Electronic Service of Process at Home and Abroad: Allow-
ing Domestic Electronic Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 55, 73 
(2010). In-hand service of process has even been the focal point for major motion pictures. 
See PINEAPPLE EXPRESS (Sony Pictures 2008). 
 36. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1) (requiring “[s]ervice of all process shall be made by a 
peace officer, by a person specially appointed by the Commissioner of Public Safety for that 
purpose or, where a rule so provides, by registered or certified mail). 
 37. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2) (stating that “[a]ny person who is at least 18 years old and 
not a party” may serve the defendant with the summons). 
 38. Service on an appointed agent is also appropriate, but is typically considered in 
separate provisions of service rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(C). 
 39. Example exclusions include service to a defendant attending a worship meeting of a 
religious organization, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1831 (West 2016), or service on a 
defendant elector on the day of an election. Id. 
 40. See Steve Sowell, 10 Things I Wish Process Servers Knew, 87-OCT MICH. B. J. 30, 
30–31; see 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 28 (2016). 
 41. WASSERMAN, supra note 25, at 130. In personam personal jurisdiction is necessary 
to impose personal liability on the defendant himself. Id.; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 
(1877). 
 42. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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sonam personal jurisdiction, the states began to authorize other, more effi-
cient, methods of service of process. 
b. Abode or Dwelling Service of Process 
Many jurisdictions also authorized a form of substituted service45 of 
process commonly referred to as abode or dwelling service. In this form of 
service, the process typically is served on a resident in the defendant’s 
dwelling. What constitutes a defendant’s “usual place of abode,” residence 
or dwelling differs considerably across jurisdictions. However, a common 
trend is to require some permanency by the defendant in the dwelling.46 A 
goal of many service provisions is to ensure the service is delivered to the 
place the defendant considers to be his “home” or “primary residence.”47 
Another limitation often imposed focuses on who may accept this form 
of service. For some jurisdictions, any competent resident will suffice.48 For 
other jurisdictions, there is a more limited group of individuals who may be 
served through dwelling service—often these limits focus on the age of the 
individual accepting service or on the relationship between the individual 
and the defendant.49 
There is also a variation of service on a defendant’s dwelling known as 
“nail and mail” service. Under this variation, the service is affixed to the 
defendant’s dwelling and subsequently mailed to the defendant, usually via 
certified or registered mail.50 For this form of dwelling service, the process 
papers must be prominently placed at the dwelling so as to sufficiently alert 
the defendant upon his return.51 
 
 45. Because this is a form of substitute service, some jurisdictions require the defendant 
to demonstrate that personal service is not availing. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
415.20(b) (West 2016). Other jurisdictions do not require this intermediate showing and 
permit the plaintiff to perform service on the defendant’s dwelling without first attempting 
service on the defendant personally. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B). 
 46. Allen E. Korpela, Annotation, Construction of Phrase “Usual Place of Abode,” or 
Similar Terms Referring to Abode, Residence, or Domicile, as Used in Statutes Relating to 
Service of Process, 32 A.L.R. 3d 112 (1970). 
 47. For example, in some jurisdictions there is a presumption that the residence that 
married spouses share is the residence that must be used when serving one of the defendant 
spouses. Id. at § 9. 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B) (noting that service may be left with “someone of suitable 
age and discretion who resides” at the defendant’s dwelling). 
 49. C.R.C.P. 4(e)(1) (noting that service may be left “with any person whose age is 
eighteen years or older and who is a member of the [defendant’s] family”). 
 50. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(4) (McKinney 2016). 
 51. Id. (requiring the summons to be affixed to the door); see J.R. Monaghan, Annota-
tion, Place or Manner of Delivering or Depositing Papers, Under Statutes Permitting Service 
of Process by Leaving Copy at Usual Place of Abode or Residence, 87 A.L.R. 2d 1163 
(1963). 
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c. Service via Mail 
Another form of service that has been authorized in many jurisdictions 
is service via mail. In many jurisdictions, service via mail must be per-
formed by certified or registered mail.52 In other instances, service may be 
performed via first-class mail, especially when the service by mail is being 
used in conjunction with other forms of service.53 
d. Constructive Notice via Publication & Catch-All Provisions 
Most jurisdictions provide for a constructive form of notice when it is 
impracticable or impossible to serve the defendant in any other manner. 
These methods almost always require court order. Despite being widely 
recognized as unlikely to provide the defendant with actual notice,54 the 
most common form of constructive notice is publication in a regularly circu-
lating newspaper. Unfortunately, this form of service of process is not only 
unlikely to reach the defendant, but also is costly for the plaintiff.55 
Jurisdictions that have recognized the limitations associated with ser-
vice via publication, have created “catch-all” provisions to strike a balance 
between the plaintiff’s interest in efficient service methods and the defend-
ant’s constitutional right to receive notice of the lawsuit.56 Under a “catch-
all” provision, the plaintiff can move the court to authorize any form of ser-
vice that would otherwise be constitutional.57 To trigger these provisions, the 
court must make a finding that the other methods authorized by the state 
service rules would not bring home notice to the defendant.58 
 
 52. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 29 (2016). For a comparison of the operation of certified 
and registered mail, see Irene A. Blake, Definitions of Certified Mail and Registered Mail, 
THE HOUS. CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/definitions-certified-mail-registered-
mail-40208.html (last visited June 22, 2016). 
 53. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20 (West 2016) (permitting service via mail when ser-
vice is also made at defendant’s office). But see Ann Varnon Crowley, Note, Rule 4: Service 
by Mail May Cost You More Than a Stamp, 61 IND. L. J. 217 (1986) (discussing the challeng-
es that ultimately led to the repeal of the former Rule 4 provision, which permitted service via 
first class mail). 
 54. Alyssa L. Eisenberg, Comment, Keep Your Facebook Friends Close and Your Pro-
cess Server Closer: The Expansion of Social Media Service of Process to Cases Involving 
Domestic Defendants, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 810–813 (2014). 
 55. Id.; Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that 
publication of legal notice in “more widely circulated newspaper, like the New York Post or 
the Daily News, might reach more readers, the cost, which approaches $1,000 for running the 
notice for a week”). 
 56. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any 
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods 
set forth in the service statute). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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2. Electronic Service of Process 
Technological advances provide new avenues for delivery of service of 
process. Surprisingly, while communication through newly developing elec-
tronic media has been embraced in many other sectors, the federal and state 
court systems have been relatively slow to adopt electronic communication 
as a regular method for notice.59 In fact, while there are some state service 
provisions providing for electronic service of pleadings and papers,60 there is 
no state service provision that permits litigants to provide service of process 
to individual defendants in the first instance, without a court order, via elec-
tronic means.61 Therefore, the movement towards electronic service of pro-
cess has been observed primarily in two areas—the judicial application of 
state catch-all service provisions, and in federal courts, when service is 
made on a defendant living abroad. 
In the context of state catch-all service provisions, the court is permit-
ted to order any method of service that would meet the constitutional stand-
ard in Mullane.62 Because these provisions are structured to operate as back-
up methods, the court must make a finding that service through traditional 
routes is impossible or impracticable. As a result, cases applying these pro-
visions in the context of electronic service often focus on this initial finding 
of impossibility or impracticability with less consideration of the “reasona-
bly certain to inform” aspect of the Mullane standard.63 
In the context of service on a defendant located in a foreign country, 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) permits the district court to order 
any method of service that is not prohibited by international agreement and 
otherwise meets the constitutional standard in Mullane.64 Similar to the state 
“catch-all” provisions, Rule 4(f)(3) requires court approval of the service 
requested.65 However, Rule 4(f)(3) does not require the court to make a find-
 
 59. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “un-
orthodox”). 
 60. NEB. CT. R. PLEADING. § 6-1105 (providing for electronic service of pleadings and 
other papers). 
 61. Some jurisdictions are making it easier for plaintiffs to seek court order for electron-
ic service of process. Stephanie Irvine, How Utah Makes Electronic Service of Process Work, 
SERVE-NOW (May 24, 2016), https://www.serve-now.com/articles/2199/how-utah-makes-
electronic-service-of-process-work. 
 62. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any 
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods 
set forth in the service statute). 
 63. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f)(3). 
 65. Id. (stating that service may include any method “as the court orders”). 
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ing that service through other methods are impracticable or impossible prior 
to ordering the requested form of service.66 
a. Telex and Facsimile 
Some of the earliest forms of technology embraced as appropriate 
methods for service of process include telex67 and facsimile transmissions.68 
In New England Merchants National Bank v. Iran Power Generation & 
Transmission Co.,69 an important early decision embracing electronic ser-
vice of process, a federal court ordered service of process on Iranian defend-
ants via telex when the American plaintiffs’ attempts to provide service via 
other traditional methods were stymied by a breakdown in relations between 
their respective countries.70 Rather than express trepidation at the prospect 
of ordering this new form of service, the New England Merchants court pro-
claimed: 
[c]ourts . . . cannot be blind to changes and advances in technology. No 
longer do we live in a world where communications are conducted solely 
by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam ships. Electronic commu-
nication via satellite can and does provide instantaneous transmission of 
notice and information. No longer must process be mailed to a defend-
ant’s door when he can receive complete notice at an electronic terminal 
inside his very office, even when the door is steel and bolted shut.
71
 
Surprisingly, in the time following this key decision, the federal courts 
were slow to embrace the use of new technologies as methods for providing 
service of process. In fact, federal courts did not begin ordering service of 
 
 66. Id. The only limitation under Rule 4(f)(3) is that the method must not be prohibited 
by international law. Id. 
 67. The telex is an older “system of communication in which messages are sent 
over long distances by using a telephone system and are printed by using a special 
machine (called a teletypewriter).” Telex, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11 th 
ed. 2015). 
 68. See generally John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail to E-Mail: The Steady 
Evolution of Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73, 83–87 (2004) (dis-
cussing the early evolution of electronic service of process). 
 69. 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
 70. Id. at 76 (noting that the plaintiffs’ attempts at service were encumbered by the fol-
lowing circumstances: “the political climate in Iran, including what appears to be a break-
down in the postal service of Iran; the severance of diplomatic relations between Iran and the 
United States and its concomitant tension and almost total lack of cooperation; and, the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq., which the defendants claim pro-
vides the ̔exclusive’ method by which the government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentali-
ties, are to be served with process in a commercial litigation.”). 
 71. Id. at 81. 
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process via facsimile (a technology similar to telex) until the early 2000s.72 
Even after courts began to embrace the use of facsimile as an acceptable 
means of providing service of process, it was with some reluctance. For ex-
ample, while courts were willing to order service by facsimile when the de-
fendants had used facsimile to communicate with the plaintiff on prior occa-
sions, other courts declined to order service by this method when such use 
had not been established.73 
While service rules have been relaxed to permit service of other plead-
ings or papers (such as answers to discovery requests) via facsimile,
 74 ser-
vice of process via facsimile has never enjoyed widespread support in the 
states. Absent express authorization or the inclusion of a “catch-all” provi-
sion, service of the summons via facsimile is not permitted. 
b. Email & Social Media 
In another landmark decision, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International 
Interlink,75 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
service of process via email was constitutionally sufficient.76 The plaintiff in 
Rio sued the defendant, a foreign internet business entity, for trademark in-
fringement.77 After traditional methods for service proved to be fruitless, the 
plaintiff moved the district court to order alternate service via email, and the 
district court granted the order.
 78 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted the “dearth of authority” supporting 
service of process by email; but the court ultimately concluded, not only was 
 
 72. Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002); Murphy III, supra, note 68 at 83–90 (discussing the early adop-
tion of fax as a method for service of process by state and federal courts). 
 73. Nabulsi v. H.H. Sheikh Issa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, No. CIV.A. H-06-2683, 2007 
WL 2964817, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2007) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ request to serve the 
defendants via facsimile because there was no evidence that the defendants used the fax 
number “to conduct business or receive important communications on a regular basis”). 
 74. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(E) (permitting service of pleadings and other papers “by 
electronic means if the person [being served] consent[s] in writing”); see also WASH. SUPER. 
CT. CIV. R. 5(b)(7). 
 75. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 76. Id. at 1018. 
 77. Id. at 1012. 
 78. The district court also ordered service on a separate organization not named as a 
defendant in the suit, IEC. IEC, an international courier, was occupying the last claimed 
physical address for the defendant in the United States. The plaintiff had originally attempted 
service on the defendant at the address now maintained by IEC. While IEC was not author-
ized to accept service on behalf of the defendant, it informed the plaintiff that it would for-
ward the summons and complaint to the defendant’s Costa Rican courier. In addition, the 
court ordered service via mail on an attorney who had inquired about the lawsuit on behalf of 
IEC. Id. at 1013. 
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service of process by email proper, “it was the method of service most likely 
to reach” the defendant.79 The court noted that the defendant lacked a physi-
cal office and had structured its business around its internet-presence, pro-
moting its email address as its “preferred contact information.”80 For these 
reasons, the court held that service of process via email was reasonably cal-
culated to apprise this defendant of the pendency of the lawsuit.81 
Following the decision in Rio, several federal courts have ordered ser-
vice via email on foreign defendants under Rule 4(f)(3).82 In those decisions, 
the defendant’s prior use of email was an important consideration used to 
support an order of alternative service via email. The courts reasoned that 
prior use supports the conclusion that the defendant will likely receive the 
email containing the summons and complaint.83 
Similar results have been reached by state courts utilizing state “catch-
all” service provisions. Following the reasoning in Rio, a New York family 
court ordered service of the divorce action via email in Hollow v. Hollow.84 
Under the New York service rules, a court can order any constitutional 
method of service so long as it finds that the traditional methods of service 
would prove to be “impracticable.”85 The Hollow court made the initial find-
ing that service would be impracticable by determining that the plaintiff’s 
husband had relocated to Saudi Arabia and the wife’s attempts at securing 
 
 79. Id. at 1017. 
 80. Id. at 1018. The court explained that “RII structured its business such that it could be 
contacted only via its email address. RII listed no easily discoverable street address in the 
United States or in Costa Rica. Rather, on its website and print media, RII designated its 
email address as its preferred contact information.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Rio Prop., Inc., 234 F.3d at 1018. 
 82. Hydentra Hlp Int. Ltd. v. Porn69.org, No. CV15-00451-PHX DGC, 2015 WL 
8064770, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2015) (ordering service via email after finding that the de-
fendant “conducts business through the internet” and “service through email will give de-
fendant sufficient notice and opportunity to respond”); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 
12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (allowing service on 
the defended via email and Facebook); Lipenga v. Kambalame, No. GJH-14-3980, 2015 WL 
9484473, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2015) (the plaintiff presented evidence that she had “elec-
tronically communicated” with the defendant in an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the 
dispute); see also F.T.Comm’n. v. Pecon Software Ltd., No. 12 CIV. 7186 (PAE), 2013 WL 
4016272, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013) (ordering service via email on those defendants that 
made “use of [the] email addresses in relation to the alleged scheme” and denying a request 
to order service via email on a defendant who did not make such use of the proposed email). 
 83. Hydentra Hlp Int. Ltd., 2015 WL 8064770, at *3. 
 84. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (the court found “that 
service directed to the defendant’s last known e-mail address as well as service by interna-
tional registered air mail and international mail standard, is sufficient to satisfy the due pro-
cess requirements”). 
 85. N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (allowing the court to order any 
manner of service if it first finds that service is impracticable under the traditional methods 
set forth in the service statute). 
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international service proved to be fruitless.86 While attempting to locate the 
husband to perform in-hand service of process, the wife communicated with 
the husband via email. In one email correspondence, the husband informed 
the wife, “I am a resident of Saudi Arabia and there’s nothing anyone can do 
to me here.”87 After ruling that the “catch all” provision applied because of 
the husband’s evasive conduct, the Hollow court concluded that service by 
email would be constitutional under Mullane because the defendant had 
continued to contact his family via email after his departure for Saudi Ara-
bia.88 
Despite the use of service via email following Rio, many courts contin-
ue to express concern over the use of email as a sole vehicle for service. As 
a result, decisions granting a request for alternative service of process via 
email often order a back-up method of service of process, including: regular 
mail; certified or registered mail; fax; or publication. 
In recent years, courts have been faced with requests to order alterna-
tive service via social media. In Fortunato v. Chase Bank U.S.A.,89 the third-
party plaintiff, Chase Bank, moved the district court to order alternative 
service via email and Facebook (along with other service methods) on a 
domestic third-party defendant who was actively evading service of pro-
cess.90 Chase Bank brought an impleader action against the estranged daugh-
ter of the plaintiff, arguing that she was liable to Chase Bank after fraudu-
lently opening a credit card account in the plaintiff’s name.91 Because the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) do not provide for service of pro-
cess via email or Facebook, the district court relied on the service rules of 
New York, which are incorporated through Rule 4(e).92 
After finding the third-party defendant intentionally evaded service of 
process, by providing fictional or out of date addresses at various points, the 
Fortunato court considered whether service via email or Facebook would be 
constitutional. The court expressed its concern about ordering service via 
Facebook, noting that it was “unorthodox to say the least.”93 This concern 
was heightened for the Fortunato court, because Chase Bank was not able to 
confirm that the third-party defendant, in fact, maintained the Facebook ac-
count located.94 A similar concern was raised about the email associated 
 
 86. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705. 
 87. Id. at 705. 
 88. Id. at 707–08. 
 89. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 (JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012). 
 90. Id. at *1–3. 
 91. Id. at *2–3. 
 92. Id. at *1. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. at *2 (the court noted its concern, explaining, “anyone can make a Facebook 
profile using real, fake, or incomplete information, and thus, there is no way for the Court to 
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with the Facebook profile; there was no evidence that the email was opera-
tional or accessed by the third-party defendant.95 Consequently, the court 
ordered service of process via publication in a local newspaper. Perhaps 
ironically, the court used the third-party defendant’s Facebook account to 
determine in which newspapers to publish notice.96 
Other courts have been more willing to consider service via social me-
dia when that service has been accompanied by other methods of service of 
process. In Federal Trade Commission v. PCCARE247 Inc.,97 the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) moved the district court to order service by email 
and Facebook on a defendant in a foreign country. The PCCARE247 court 
held that service by email alone would be constitutional because the defend-
ant “ran an internet-based business and used email frequently for communi-
cation.”98 The court also specifically noted that the defendant had used the 
email addresses in connection with the scheme that formed the basis of the 
FTC’s action and had even communicated with the court through one of the 
email addresses.99 
After holding that the proposed service via email was constitutional, 
the PCCARE247 court turned to the issue of whether service via Facebook 
was also constitutional. The court explained that the Facebook accounts 
were connected with the email addresses known to be associated with the 
defendants and with a website that was connected with the defendants’ ac-
tions in the underlying dispute.100 Moreover, the court noted that the Face-
book accounts could be connected to the defendants because of the personal 
information posted on the profile that was linked to known information 
about the defendants and the connections between the account and other 
known linked accounts.101 For all of these reasons, the court held that the 
FTC had “demonstrated a likelihood that service by Facebook message 
would reach the defendants.”102 Despite these determinations, the 
PCCARE247 court cautioned that “service by Facebook is a relatively novel 
 
confirm whether the Nicole Fortunato the investigator found is in fact the third-party Defend-
ant to be served”). 
 95. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2. 
 96. Id. at *8–10. 
 97. FTC v. PCCARE 247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
 98. Id. at *13. (explaining that the “FTC has, therefore, demonstrated a high likelihood 
that defendants will receive and respond to emails sent to these addresses” and “[s]ervice by 
email alone, therefore, would comport with due process”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at *16. In fact, the defendants use the Facebook pages to advertise their business. 
Id at *6. 
 101. Id. (stating the Facebook account was linked via a “friend” request to another known 
person who was linked to the defendant outside of Facebook). 
 102. Id. 
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concept, and that it is conceivable that defendants will not in fact receive 
notice by this means.”103 For this reason, the court emphasized that service 
by Facebook was being used as a way to “backstop the service upon each 
defendant at his, or its, known email address.”104 After expressing these 
words of caution, the PCCARE247 court encouraged courts to continue to 
embrace new technology when considering whether to authorize new meth-
ods for service of process, saying, “history teaches that, as technology ad-
vances and modes of communication progress, courts must be open to con-
sidering requests to authorize service via technological means of then-recent 
vintage, rather than dismissing them out of hand as novel.”105 
Following the PCCARE247 decision, other courts approved service via 
social media when it accompanied service via email or mail. In each of these 
decisions, the court required some proof that the defendant owned the social 
media account and made regular use of it. For example, in WhosHere, Inc., 
v. Orun,106 the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant had referred 
plaintiff to his social media accounts that bore the defendant’s name and 
identifying information.107 Finally, the plaintiff introduced evidence that the 
defendant had made regular and recent use of the social media accounts, 
even identifying himself as a “mobile technology enthusiast” on one ac-
count.108 Based on this evidence, the court found that the collective service 
attempts to the defendant’s two email accounts and two social networking 
accounts would provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the litiga-
tion.109 
Even when the defendant has not made clear use of email and social 
media, courts have ordered service via social media as a “backstop” to other 
service methods. For example, in Ferrarese v. Shaw,110 the court authorized 
service of process via email and Facebook as backstop methods to service 
by certified mail with a return receipt requested to the defendant’s last 
known address and to the defendant’s sister at the same address.111 The de-
fendant in Ferrarese actively evaded service by using multiple fictitious 
names.112 Those efforts stymied the plaintiff’s ability to verify the email and 
 
 103. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037 at *5. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. WhosHere, Inc., v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 20, 2014). 
 107. Id. at *4. The plaintiff introduced the defendant’s emails, and made explicit refer-
ence to his social media accounts. 
 108. Id. at *4–5 n.9. 
 109. Id. at *4. 
 110. 164 F.Supp.3d 361 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2016). 
 111. Id. at 367–68. 
 112. Id. at 363–64, 367. 
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social media accounts.113 Because the email and social media account ser-
vice was only being used to supplement the other forms of service, the court 
was more willing to authorize its use.114 
Recently, courts have addressed whether service through social media 
alone would be constitutional. In 2015, a New York Supreme Court ordered 
service of a divorce summons via Facebook private message in Baidoo v. 
Blood-Dzraku.115 The Baidoo court accepted the plaintiff’s affidavits verify-
ing the Facebook account belonged to the defendant by affirming that the 
photographs associated with the account were that of the defendant.116 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff attached copies of exchanges between herself and the 
defendant on the Facebook account.117 This collective information about the 
Facebook account supported the court’s determination that the Facebook 
account belonged to the defendant and that he regularly logged into the ac-
count.118 Based on these findings, the Baidoo court held that service through 
the Facebook account was constitutional under Mullane.119 
In determining whether to order an additional “backstop” method of 
service, the Baidoo court reasoned that the plaintiff did not have any other 
method available to her.120 For example, the defendant did not have an email 
address121 and his last known physical address was over four years old.122 
Finally, the Baidoo court addressed why it decided to award service via Fa-
cebook rather than publication in a local newspaper. Specifically, the court 
explained that it determined the Facebook service would be more likely to 
reach the defendant. It stated, publication “is almost guaranteed not to pro-
vide a defendant with notice of the action for divorce.”123 Additionally, the 
court was troubled that publication notice would impose significant costs on 
the plaintiff.124 
 
 113. Id. at 364. 
 114. Id. at 367–68. 
 115. 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 116. Id. at 714–15. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 716. 
 120. Id. at 712. 
 121. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 714–15. The court did not explain why the plaintiff was not 
able to identify an email account through the defendant’s Facebook account, but it was pre-
sumably because Facebook has recently changed to hide this information unless the account 
holder agrees to release it. 
 122. Id. at 715. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 716. The court explained that “a more widely circulated newspaper, like the 
New York Post or the Daily News” would cost approximately “$1,000 for running the notice 
for a week” and “the chances of it being [sic] seen by defendant, buried in an obscure section 
of the paper and printed in small type, are still infinitesimal.” Id. 
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To accomplish service, the Baidoo court ordered the plaintiff’s attorney 
to send the defendant the divorce summons by using a private message 
through Facebook. The attorney was instructed to “log into plaintiff’s Face-
book account and message the defendant by first identifying himself, and 
then including either a web address of the summons or attaching an image of 
the summons.”125 The service was to be repeated “once a week for three 
consecutive weeks or until acknowledged by the defendant.”126 After the 
initial message, “[the] plaintiff and her attorney [were] to call and text mes-
sage defendant to inform him that the summons for divorce has been sent to 
him via Facebook.”127 
In 2016, in St. Francis of Assisi v. Kuwait Financial House, a federal 
district court permitted service on a foreign defendant solely through the use 
of his Twitter account.128 The court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(f)(3), which permits service on an individual in a foreign country when the 
service meets the Mullane standard and the method of service is not prohib-
ited by international agreement.129 The plaintiff was unable to locate the 
defendant, a Kuwaiti national, despite using a skip trace.130 In ordering ser-
vice via Twitter, the court noted that the defendant made regular use of his 
Twitter account; his account had a “large following,” and he used it to 
“fundraise large sums of money for terrorist organizations by providing 
bank-account numbers to make donations.”131 Given the defendant’s active 
use of Twitter to communicate with others and the inability to locate the 
defendant, the court found that service via Twitter would not only be “rea-
sonably calculated to give notice” to the defendant, it would also be “the 
‘method of service most likely to reach’” the defendant.132 
C. Service via Social Media in Foreign Countries 
While service of process via social media may still be viewed as “unor-
thodox” by courts in the United States, foreign court systems have been 
more willing to order service of process via social media. In 2008, an Aus-
tralian court entered a default judgment for a lender against the defendant 
mortgagees after they defaulted on their loan.133 While under Australian law, 
 
 125. Id. at 716. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716. 
 128. No. 3:16-CV-3240-LB, 2016 WL 5725002 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016). 
 129. Id. at *1. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *2. 
 133. Nick Abrahams, Australian court serves documents via Facebook, THE SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (December 12, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/web/ 
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the default judgment was to be served on the defendants through personal 
service; the lender, however, was unable to effect service on the defendants 
after eleven attempts.134 After the lender’s lawyers were able to confirm the 
defendants’ Facebook accounts through personal information posted to the 
account, the court ordered substituted service on the Facebook accounts.135 
Citing to the Australian decision, a New Zealand court ordered service 
via email and Facebook on a defendant who could not be located for person-
al service.136 In its decision, the New Zealand court pointed to the defend-
ant’s prior communications with the plaintiff via email and the fact that de-
fendant was known to have a Facebook account as grounds for why substi-
tuted electronic service was warranted.137 
Courts in Canada138 and South Africa139 have also awarded service of 
process via Facebook. Recently, a court in the United Kingdom ordered 
service of an order of injunction via Twitter.140 These decisions represent a 
growing consensus that service via social media, at least in certain instances, 
is a valid and reliable form of notice. 
 
australian-court-serves-documents-via-facebook/2008/12/12/1228585107578.html; CPB 
Lawyers, Substituted Service of Legal Documents via Facebook: “Like” or “Unlike” by 
Australian Courts, LEXOLOGY (December 13, 2012) http://www.lexology.com/library/detail- 
.aspx?g=1e184550-fa73-4c6c-bc6d-b5a160fab4b9. 
 134. Noel Towell, Lawyers to service notices on Facebook, THE SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (December 16, 2008), http://www.smh.com.au/news/technology/biztech/lawyers-to-
serve-notices-on-facebook/2008/12/16/1229189579001.html. 
 135. CPB Lawyers, Substituted Service of Legal Documents via Facebook: “Like” or 
“Unlike” by Australian Courts, LEXOLOGY (December 13, 2012) 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1e184550-fa73-4c6c-bc6d-b5a160fab4b9. 
However, in Citigroup v Weerakoon, an Australian court denied a motion to serve defendant 
via Facebook after noting lack of certainty that the Facebook was the defendant’s account. Id. 
 136. You’ve been served–on Facebook, TECHNOLOGY (March 16, 2009, 2:29 PM), 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/2266647/You-ve-been-served-on-Facebook. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Lisa McManus, Service of Process Through Facebook, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL 
NEWSROOM, (Nov. 9, 2011) https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/legal-
technology-and-social-media/archive/2011/11/09/service-of-process-through-facebook.aspx 
?Redirected=true (discussing a Canadian court’s decision to allow service via Facebook and 
notice to the defendant’s HR department where the defendant had formerly worked). 
 139. Lee Swales, Serving Legal Process via Facebook and Social Media, SOC. MEDIA 
AND REG. L. (Nov. 8, 2012) http://www.regulatorylawsa.com/2012/11/serving-legal-process-
via-facebook-and.html (discussing the Kwa-Zulu Natal High Court’s decision to allow ser-
vice via Facebook). 
 140. Matthew Jones, UK Court orders writ to be served via Twitter, REUTERS: 
TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 1. 2009, 5:29 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-twitter-life-
tech-idUSTRE5904HC20091001. 
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III. DECONSTRUCTING THE MULLANE STANDARD: THE PRINCIPLES 
UNDERLYING THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT 
This section begins with a call to ground any discussion of appropriate 
methods of service of process in the principles of due process. After present-
ing the justification for such an approach, this section details the underlying 
due process principles of the notice requirement. 
A. The Need for a Principled Approach in a Time of Technological Ad-
vance 
Much of the current literature critiquing electronic service of process 
focuses on how each particular tool—Facebook or Twitter—meets, or fails 
to meet, the Mullane standard.141 This piecemeal approach to examining 
service of process is largely inefficient and fails to place service via social 
media in a larger constitutional context. 
First, the Mullane Court always intended the consideration of new ser-
vice methods to remain grounded in the larger context of the principles of 
due process.142 The Mullane Court rejected piecemeal formulation of rules; 
instead, it provided a test based on the principles of due process, intending 
that test to be applied to new methods of service.143 While the Mullane test 
might invite an overly fact-intensive inquiry into each possible service op-
tion, as has been seen in the context of electronic service of process, the 
Mullane Court itself applied the principles of due process to recognize the 
constitutionality of categories of process methods. For example, the “gold 
standard” of notice—in-hand personal service of process—was heralded as a 
 
 141. See Pedram Tabibi, Esq., Facebook Notification - You’ve Been Served: Why Social 
Media Service of Process May Soon Be a Virtual Reality, 7 PHX. L. REV. 37 (2013) (focusing 
on Facebook); William Wagner & Joshua R. Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a 
Fair Method of Alternative Service, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 259 (2013) (focusing on Facebook); 
Keely Knapp, Comment, #serviceofprocess @socialmedia: Accepting Social Media for Ser-
vice of Process in the 21st Century, 74 LA. L. REV. 547 (2014)(focusing primarily on Face-
book); Eisenberg, supra note 54 (focusing on Facebook); Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-
Service: Ensuring the Integrity of International E-Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285 (2008) (focusing on email); Svetlana Gitman, Comment, 
(Dis)service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule 4 to Comply with Modern Usage of Tech-
nology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (2012) (focusing on email); Claire M. Specht, Com-
ment, Text Message Service of Process-No LOL Matter: Does Text Message Service of Pro-
cess Comport with Due Process?, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2012) (focusing on text mes-
saging). 
 142. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 143. Id. (affirming that “[t]he Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a 
balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive 
notice may be utilized or what test it must meet”). 
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presumptively constitutional form of service.144 It is important to note that 
the Mullane Court did not delve into an individualized critique of in-hand 
service of process, but rather embraced this method as categorically consti-
tutional.145 
Second, a piecemeal approach that focuses on the particular operation 
of an individual social media tool has limited application. Technology is 
rapidly changing; not only are new social media tools being created, but the 
ways in which “standard” tools, such as Facebook, are used, is constantly 
changing. As an example, in recent years, Facebook has changed aspects of 
its messaging service. Now users can receive “read receipts” alerting them 
when another user reads their private message.146 For scholars and courts 
concerned with the existence of a “read receipt,” this change could radically 
impact their recommendations or future opinions.147 By focusing on the op-
erations of current electronic tools, any recommendation or holding has a 
short-lived utility. Additionally, the jurisprudence of notice is deprived of 
useful analysis that is not confined to the features of a particular communi-
cation tool. Because the law of notice is being made in a time where the 
medium of communication is changing at record pace,148 it is more advanta-
geous to focus on identifying the principles underlying the due process no-
tice requirement. Using these guiding principles, generalized recommenda-
 
 144. Id. at 313 (noting that “personal service of written notice within the jurisdiction is 
the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding”). 
 145. Id. For example, the Court did not examine limitations to personal service of process 
that may exist in a particular case such as fraudulently luring a defendant into the forum to 
achieve service. While service under these circumstances would not be constitutional, the 
Court focused on a more generalized view of personal service in the context of the principles 
of due process. 
 146. How do I know if a friend has seen a message I sent?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/ipad-app/316575021742112 (last visited June 22, 2016). 
 147. Early commentary on the propriety of service via email focused on the ability to 
confirm receipt of the email via a “read receipt.” See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Catch Me If You 
Can: Serving United States Process on an Elusive Defendant Abroad, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
211, 229 (2003); Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail” from Meaning “You’ve 
Been Served”: How Service of Process by E-Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional Procedural 
Due Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1135–36 (2005); Hedges, supra 
note 35, at 63. 
 148. There are over 1.5 billion monthly active users of Facebook. Number of monthly 
active Facebook users worldwide as of 1st quarter 2016 (in millions), STATISTICA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-
worldwide/. In the U.S., twenty percent of all time spent on personal computers and thirty 
percent of time spent on mobile devices is spent on social media. Helen A.S. Popkin, We 
spent 230,060 years on social media in one month, CNBC: TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 4, 2012) 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100275798. People are spending on average 1.72 hours on social 
media each day. Jason Mander, Daily time spent on social networks rises to 1.72 hours, 
GLOBALWEBINDEX (Jan. 26, 2015) http://www.globalwebindex.net/blog/daily-time-spent-on-
social-networks-rises-to-1-72-hours. 
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tions can be derived which then can be applied to future possible electronic 
service methods. This approach will provide more guidance to courts in the 
changing technological climate and permit the development of a more cohe-
sive body of law. 
Finally, by failing to take a principle-driven approach, judicial commit-
tees and legislatures are deprived of guidance on how to revise the service 
rules, and courts are left to wade in uncertain waters. As a result of this un-
certainty, courts have expressed strong reservation in approving new meth-
ods of service of process.149 While there have been some isolated legislative 
revisions to service rules to account for electronic service of process,150 
these advances have generally not included newer tools such as social me-
dia.151 The vast majority of cases addressing electronic service of process 
have been on a case-by-case approach under a “catchall provision” included 
in service rules.152 While “catchall provisions” are useful for courts attempt-
ing to create a method of service in an unusual situation, the widespread use 
of electronic communication such as email and social media suggest that 
they will become a common way to locate and communicate with proposed 
defendants.153 As such, there should be more guidance in the service rules on 
how to appropriately effectuate service through these methods. 
For these reasons, the following section offers an approach to analyz-
ing the due process notice requirement that is grounded in the underlying 
principles of procedural due process. These shared notions of due process, 
though sometimes implicit, are present throughout modern notice jurispru-
dence.154 In this section, the principles underlying the due process notice 
 
 149. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unor-
thodox”); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (rejecting service via social media as a sole means of providing 
notice because of its novelty); WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 
670817, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2014). 
 150. While Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits parties to move the court 
for alternative service methods, the court webpage explains that this can include social media. 
Motion for Alternative Service, UTAH COURTS (April 26, 2016) 
https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/alternate_service.html (last visited June 23, 2016). 
 151. While catch-all provisions permit the court to fashion any form of constitutional 
service, they are not specifically directed at social media. In 2013, Texas legislators intro-
duced a bill that would have affirmatively provided for service of process via social media so 
long as the parties sought prior court approval. H.B. 1989, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
Ultimately, the bill was unsuccessful. 
 152. Supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the use of catch-all provisions to order service via 
social media). 
 153. See Baruah, supra note 3, at 1–10 (discussing the impact of social media on the way 
people communicate and process information). 
 154. Wasserman, supra note 25, at 132–33 (describing the Mullane test as based on “gen-
eral principles” gleaned by the Court from precedent and “disjunctive”). 
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requirement are identified, examined, and applied to the context of service 
of process via social media. 
B. The Underlying Principles of Notice 
Common throughout modern constitutional analysis of the notice re-
quirement are several recognizable principles which serve as benchmarks to 
judge the sufficiency of the proposed method of service of process. While 
these norms are not always clearly articulated by courts, they are woven 
throughout notice jurisprudence. 
1. The Method of Service Must be Directed at the Correct Defendant 
The due process clause provides an individualized right to notice of a 
proceeding that will bind the individual to an adverse judgment.155 The pur-
pose of this notice is to provide the individual with an opportunity to be 
heard and present a case in opposition to the claims asserted against him, or 
choose not to do so and accept the judgment.156 Given the individualized 
nature of the right to be heard, the plaintiff must serve the correct defendant 
and direct service (or provide service directly) to the named defendant.157 
Service provided to an incorrect defendant, either by misnaming the defend-
ant or providing service incorrectly directed at the defendant, is insuffi-
cient.158 When the plaintiff becomes aware of these errors, the service rules 
often provide ways for her to correct the service by amending her summons 
or requiring her to get a new summons and perfect service of process.159 For 
example, a plaintiff might become aware that she named the wrong defend-
ant or that the address at which she was attempting service was incorrect 
(either because the server was unable to locate the defendant or her attempt 
to serve by mail was returned).160 In each of these situations, the plaintiff 
must work to correct the service or she will not be able to secure a binding 
 
 155. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See J.E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Necessity, in Service by Leaving Process at Place of 
Abode, etc., of Leaving a Copy of Summons for Each Party Sought to be Served, 8 A.L.R. 2d 
343 (1949) (noting that even when serving multiple defendants who reside at the same dwell-
ing, “a copy of the summons must be left for each defendant”). 
 158. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 88 (explaining that while a misnaming of the de-
fendant can be corrected by amendment of the summons even after a judgment is entered, the 
court cannot amend the summons after judgment to include the name of a defendant who was 
not named and not served). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 83 (explaining “the test is whether the plaintiff had 
in mind the person who was actually served and merely made a mistake as to the name or 
whether the plaintiff actually meant to serve and sue a different defendant”). 
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judgment against the defendant. The fact that service rules provide for these 
types of alterations reinforces the need to provide sufficiently directed indi-
vidualized service—the mere fact that such service may be difficult to ac-
complish is not enough to obviate the importance of this aspect of notice. 
While individualized notice directed at the defendant is clearly consti-
tutional, the Mullane Court offered some instances where less individualized 
and less directed notice would also be considered constitutional.161 The Mul-
lane Court focused on the balance of interests at play, a hallmark of proce-
dural due process review. The individual’s right to notice of the proceeding 
on the one hand, is essential to the exercise of his opportunity to be heard.162 
On the other hand, the state has a strong interest in providing a final, binding 
remedy to the plaintiff.163 The Mullane Court reasoned that the individual’s 
right to notice is sufficiently weighty that some costly or time consuming 
processes are warranted to guarantee proper notice.164 
There are times, however, when this type of individualized notice is not 
possible or practicable. The Mullane Court recognized this possibility and 
provided some room for a less individualized form of notice to pass consti-
tutional muster.165 The Court cautioned against a relaxed interpretation of 
the procedural due process clause by mandating the plaintiff must use good 
faith in securing proper service to the defendant.166 Namely, the Court coun-
tenanced against service that amounted to a “mere gesture.”167 Rather, the 
service must be that which “one desirous of actually informing the absentee 
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.”168 
In addition to the challenge of identifying the defendant, there are also 
times when being able to direct service at the defendant poses a significant 
hurdle to a plaintiff. Sometimes a defendant may not be easy to locate. For 
example, some defendants do not have a permanent address or have recently 
moved. Other times, defendants actively work to conceal their whereabouts 
 
 161. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 162. Id. at 314. 
 163. Id. at 311 (explaining that the state was interested in “the right of its courts to adju-
dicate at all against [those defendants] who reside” outside of the state). 
 164. Id. at 315–18 (requiring more than publication for defendants that could be identi-
fied). 
 165. Sometimes a defendant may not be identifiable, making individualized notice impos-
sible. In Mullane, several of the beneficiaries were not identifiable because they only had 
interests that would have vested at a future event or they were not sufficiently identified to 
enable individualized notice. Id. at 317. Other times, the identification of the defendant may 
be impracticable. For example, in Mullane, the very nature of the common trust drew many 
smaller trusts, many with numerous beneficiaries that were too difficult to identify by name 
because of the sheer volume of potential beneficiaries and the cost and labor that such identi-
fication would require. Id. at 317–18. 
 166. Id. at 315. 
 167. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. 
 168. Id. 
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to avoid being served with process. When the failure to locate the defendant 
is occasioned by the defendant’s own evasive or deceptive behavior, courts 
have been more willing to permit the plaintiff to use alternative, less di-
rected methods of service.169 However, when the defendant has simply been 
difficult to locate, the courts have been reticent to relax the obligations im-
posed by individualized and directed service of process.170 This restrictive 
interpretation of the constitutional obligation of notice means that, at times, 
the court has rejected the plaintiff’s attempts at service.171 Other times, this 
means a plaintiff with a difficult to locate defendant will be required to ei-
ther petition the court to approve another form of service of process or will 
be required to provide ineffective and expensive service via publication.172 
When considering how much to relax the requirement that notice be 
both individualized and directed at the defendant, courts have also acknowl-
edged the protective measures that are present in certain cases that bolster 
the defendant’s opportunity to be heard. For example, when the defendant’s 
interests are sufficiently aligned with other named parties who can be more 
easily provided sufficient service of process, there is less concern that the 
defendant who is not provided with individualized and directed service of 
process will not have his defense presented to the court.
 173 This is because 
the defendants served with more reliable methods of service of process are 
likely to come to court to present the very arguments the difficult to locate 
defendants might have presented. When this is coupled with challenges to 
providing the individual with direct service of process, the constitutional 
balance present in Mullane is met.174 
 
 169. Lavery v. Lopez, 517 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1987) (holding the defendant was es-
topped from challenging deficiency in service when the defendant intentionally provided 
plaintiff with an incorrect address at the scene of the accident which was the basis of the 
action). 
 170. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317 (rejecting service through publication on defendants who 
could be identified and served via mail); Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, at 9, 450 S.W.3d 
672, 677 (rejecting service through email even though defendant was an out of state resident 
who allegedly libeled plaintiff online and could not be located to serve via mail). 
 171. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, at 9, 450 S.W.3d at 677. 
 172. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (rejecting electronic service of process request and ordering service 
by publication). 
 173. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319 (noting that the interests of the defendants who would not 
receive more directed service “[did] not stand alone but [were] identical with that of a class”). 
 174. Id.; see also Wasserman, supra note 25, at 148–154 (discussing notice in the context 
of class actions); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era 
of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2036 (2008) (discussing notice 
after the Class Action Fairness Act). 
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2. Notice Must Be Conspicuous 
Another key principle underlying the constitutional jurisprudence of 
notice is the conspicuousness of service of process. In addition to ensuring 
that the proper information is conveyed to the defendant, it must be con-
veyed in a manner that is “reasonably calculated” to “apprise” him of his 
rights.175 The Mullane Court opted to avoid a rigid test on what this actually 
requires of a plaintiff. However, when one observes the aggregate of case 
law on the sufficiency of manner of notice, it is clear, to “apprise” a defend-
ant of a proceeding against him, the notice must make him aware of the pro-
ceeding and must prompt him to seize his opportunity to be heard on the 
matter.
 176 
Awareness of a proceeding can be accomplished so long as the manner 
utilized for service of process provides the necessary components of no-
tice—providing the name and location of the court, the statement of the 
claims asserted against the defendant, and the date and time he is to appear. 
A plaintiff could fail to make a defendant aware of the proceeding if she 
provides service of process in a manner that the defendant will not, or can-
not, receive. 
The awareness of the notice itself is often the focal point of cases dis-
cussing constructive methods of service of process such as publication or 
service via postings to a structure. In part, this is because constructive meth-
ods are likely to never make their way to the defendant. Even the Mullane 
Court noted how unlikely it is for a defendant to observe a printed notice in 
a circulating publication.177 As readership in printed publications continues 
to decline, this method of notice will become an even less effective way to 
ensure a defendant is made aware of a proceeding against him.178 
The inability to make the defendant aware of a proceeding is not a de-
fect limited to notice via publication. In Greene v. Lindsey,179 the Court 
struck down service in an eviction proceeding as unconstitutional when it 
was provided via posting on the tenants’ doors.180 While this method was 
statutorily approved, the Court explained that it was not constitutional be-
 
 175. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 176. Id. (holding that all relevant required information about the proceeding should be 
included); 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 59 (summons should “clearly inform[] the defendant 
that he or she is the intended defendant” and “inform[] the defendant of the nature of the 
proceedings and of the court where the hearing will be held”). 
 177. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (noting that it would be “idle to pretend that publication 
alone . . . is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are 
before the courts”). 
 178. Eisenberg, supra note 54 (discussing the challenges to print publication as a method 
of service). 
 179. 456 U.S. 444 (1982). 
 180. Id. at 453. 
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cause it was not likely that the notice would come to the attention of the 
defendant.181 These types of postings could be easily removed by other ten-
ants; this had, in fact, occurred on prior occasions at this building.182 The 
concern that the defendant would never be made aware of the proceeding 
because the notice would not come to his attention and the fact that other 
more reliable means of service were available to the plaintiff rendered this 
method of notice unconstitutional.183 
In Dusenbery v. United States,184 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent revealed 
that she was concerned with the majority’s endorsement of service on a 
prisoner via mail as constitutional when the prisoner did not sign for the 
mail.185 While the statutorily approved method of service did not require 
such a signature, it was the practice of the prison to require prisoner signa-
tures when mail was delivered to a prisoner.186 Justice Ginsburg raised the 
concern that the defendant would not be made aware of the service; howev-
er, while the majority did not share her concern, it did recognize that aware-
ness of the notice itself is an essential aspect of notice.187 
Beyond making the defendant aware of the proceeding, notice must be 
able to prompt the defendant to seize his opportunity to be heard in court.188 
This aspect of apprising a defendant of his rights or “attract[ing] [his] atten-
tion to the proceeding”189 is essential as it motivates him to look deeper into 
the claims against him and maybe even consult with a lawyer. As service of 
process methods are evolving, this is becoming more of a concern. Howev-
er, this aspect of notice has always been an underlying theme in the constitu-
tional analysis of notice and is even present in the unwavering endorsement 
of in-hand personal service of process as a “gold standard” method of no-
tice. 
 
 181. Id. at 453–54. (The Court explained, “As the process servers were well aware, notic-
es posted on apartment doors in the area where these tenants lived were ‘not infrequently’ 
removed by children or other tenants before they could have their intended effect. Under 
these conditions, notice by posting on the apartment door cannot be considered a ‘reliable 
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts.’”). 
Id. 
 182. Id. at 453. 
 183. Id. at. 453–456. 
 184. 534 U.S. 161 (2002). 
 185. Id. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 171–72. 
 187. Id. at 168 (noting that the issue was whether “the notice in this case ‘reasonably 
calculated under all the circumstances’ to apprise petitioner of the pendency of the cash for-
feiture”). 
 188. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950) (discussing the 
challenge with notice via publication is this case was its inability to “attract the parties’ atten-
tion to the proceeding” and failure to “reasonably be expected to convey a warning”). 
 189. Id. 
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One way we can ensure notice will provide this prompting is by ensur-
ing the process is sufficiently formal. Formality in legal proceedings serves 
an important purpose; it sets the moment apart from other mundane activi-
ties, defining the very event as significant. In-hand personal service of pro-
cess carries with it many formal attributes that serve to set it apart as im-
portant.190 In many states, the process server is a designated official (such as 
a sheriff or marshal).191 Even receiving a hand-delivered document is a more 
formal way to obtain information than everyday communication.192 
Beyond the formality associated with it, in-hand service of process is 
sufficiently conspicuous simply because of its traditional role in the U.S. 
legal system.193 Like its procedural due process counterpart, personal juris-
diction, traditional forms of notice are arguably constitutionally sufficient 
because of their widespread adoption at the time of Mullane.194 The Su-
preme Court addressed the constitutionality of asserting personal jurisdic-
tion by way of serving a non-resident defendant while he was in the forum, a 
process known as tag or transient jurisdiction, in Burnham v. Superior Court 
of California, City of Marin.195 While the Court unanimously agreed that the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction was constitutional, the justices disagreed as 
to why tag personal jurisdiction was proper. Justice Scalia, writing for a 
plurality, argued that tag jurisdiction was a constitutionally acceptable way 
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant because it had been 
traditionally regarded as such.196 Justice Scalia explained that the only con-
sideration for the Court should be the historical pedigree of the method.197 
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, disagreed that history alone could 
serve as the litmus test for whether tag jurisdiction was constitutional.198 
However, in applying the International Shoe test to tag jurisdiction, Justice 
Brennan explained that the act of getting tagged in the forum created an 
expectation in the defendant that he would be hailed into the forum for the 
claim that was the basis of the suit for which he was tagged.199 This expecta-
tion arose, in part, because of the accepted practice of tag jurisdiction and its 
accepted meaning. 
 
 190. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing the importance of the ritual function of in-
hand service of process). 
 191. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing who may serve notice). 
 192. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See WRIGHT, supra note 20 (discussing the connection between notice and personal 
jurisdiction). 
 195. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 196. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 197. Id. at 621 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “for our purposes, its validation is its 
pedigree, as the phrase ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ makes clear.”). 
 198. Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 199. Id. at 635–38. 
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While the tests for procedural due process in the context of personal ju-
risdiction and notice have evolved along different paths following the mod-
ern tests of International Shoe and Mullane, the constitutional analysis in 
the context of personal jurisdiction has significant points of overlap with 
notice. Namely, the Court’s reliance on the perceived expectations from the 
practice of being served suggests that the shared understanding of its legal 
significance contributes to its acceptance as constitutional. Viewing in-hand 
service through the lens of Burnham, one can appreciate why in-hand ser-
vice of process has consistently been supported as a constitutionally suffi-
cient form of notice. By the very fact of it being built into the fabric of our 
litigation process, through a common understanding of its meaning200 devel-
oped by its historic use, in-hand service of process is a sufficiently proper 
way to “apprise” a defendant of his opportunity to be heard. Personal service 
is highly conspicuous—the act itself is notable and imbued with enough 
meaning201 that it will spur the defendant to seize his opportunity to be heard 
on the matter. 
Methods less formal and less engrained in our cultural understanding 
must achieve conspicuousness in another way. One example of a method for 
service of process that has garnered widespread support is service via mail. 
While there are multiple variations on how states permit service via mail, a 
common requirement is for the mail to be sent via certified202 or registered 
mail.203 This type of mailing requires a signature upon delivery and ensures 
that undeliverable mail will be returned to the sender. By requiring a signa-
ture, the state is accomplishing two goals—ensuring the defendant actually 
receives the mail and increasing the likelihood that the defendant will be 
signaled to the importance of the contents of the mail.204 
Few states permit service of process via ordinary mail absent some ad-
ditional considerations. For example, for those states that do permit service 
via mail, they require the plaintiff to couple service via ordinary mail with 
another method of service.205 The additional limitations present on the use of 
service via ordinary mail reflect the concerns with its conspicuousness. The 
requirement of a back-up service method increases the likelihood that the 
defendant will take note of the notice he receives. Alternatively, if other 
 
 200. Hedges, supra note 35, at 73. 
 201. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the cultural significance 
of in-hand service of process). 
 202. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 195 (2016) (explaining the restrictions on certified mail). 
 203. 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 29 (2016). 
 204. Arguably, even if a signature were not required, the receipt of certified or registered 
mail is considered to be sufficiently conspicuous to apprise the defendant of the importance 
of the contents of the mail. 
 205. See, e.g., CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.20 (West 2016) (permitting service via mail 
when service is also made at the defendant’s office). 
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methods are not available, the service by ordinary mail becomes acceptable 
as a method that is “not substantially less likely to bring home notice” than 
other available methods.206 
Many states permit service of process via service on a defendant’s 
dwelling. This typically occurs when the plaintiff serves a statutorily ap-
proved person who resides at the defendant’s dwelling.207 Again, present in 
this recognized method of service is an appreciation of the conspicuousness 
of the service. By serving the defendant at his dwelling, we accept that the 
plaintiff has brought the notice home to the defendant—to the place where 
we expect him to be found, and he expects to receive important infor-
mation.208 The limitation on who can receive the service at the dwelling is 
similarly linked to conspicuousness and awareness. Most states, and the 
FRCP, require the individual to be a resident of the dwelling.209 This ensures 
that the person also views the dwelling as a home and takes heed of im-
portant notice delivered to the dwelling. Moreover, the person served must 
be of a suitable age and discretion to appreciate the importance of the notice 
and the need to provide it to the defendant.210 Some states set specific age 
limits while others have a more flexible consideration of suitability.211 Under 
either approach, the rules establish these precautions to ensure the notice 
will be brought to the attention of the defendant. 
As courts have considered less traditional methods of service, the de-
sire to ensure that the method of service will be sufficiently conspicuous so 
as to “attract the parties’ attention to the proceeding”212 predominates the 
notice analysis. For example, one common thread of analysis is the desire to 
identify whether the defendant has used the proposed method for service as 
a mode of communication in other important matters.213 Arguably, by rely-
ing on a method of communication that the defendant himself had used to 
conduct his business (and other important affairs) the court ensures that the 
defendant would be likely to see the notice and that he would be sufficiently 
 
 206. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). 
 207. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 208. This is in part, because the definition of “dwelling” or “abode” denotes a place of 
permanence akin to one’s home. Id.; 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 178 (2016) (noting that 
while there is some disagreement of how to define “dwelling” or “abode” there is consensus 
that “the person [must be] living [there] at the particular time” of service). 
 209. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 191(2016). 
 210. See supra Section II.B.1.b. 
 211. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 192 (2016). 
 212. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950). 
 213. For example, in Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, the court permitted service 
via email after noting, among other considerations, that the defendant had repeatedly used 
email to communicate with the plaintiff in relation to matters that formed the basis of the suit. 
284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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apprised of his need to respond to information received this way.214 After all, 
if the defendant is in the habit of responding and acting on information re-
ceived by a certain method, he will do the same with notice sent by this 
route. 
In many of the above methods of service of process—service via in-
hand, mail, dwelling and email—the importance of the conspicuousness of 
the notice is implicit in the endorsement of the method or in the limitations 
added to the method. In the context of service via publication or posting, 
conspicuousness of the notice is often explicitly addressed in the service 
rules or by the court when ordering the notice.215 The concern over conspic-
uousness only highlights the importance of this principle of notice, despite 
its often implicit assumption into constitutional analysis. 
3. The Delivery of Service Must Be Verifiable 
The next key principle underlying the constitutional jurisprudence of 
notice is the need to ensure that the method of service can be independently 
verified. This is an important aspect of notice and is necessary to preserve 
the defendant’s opportunity to be heard.216 To ensure the integrity of its pro-
cess, the court must be able to ensure that the service of process was actually 
made.217 This cannot be done unless there is an independent way to verify 
the act of service of process through independent and authenticated evi-
dence.218 Additionally, in most jurisdictions, a defendant has a sufficient 
opportunity to challenge faulty service of process.219 
Proof of service of process can be accomplished in a variety of ways. 
When the server is not an official (such as a sheriff or marshal), most juris-
dictions require the individual who performed service file an affidavit with 
the court describing how and when service was accomplished.220 The de-
fendant can challenge the affidavit and have an evidentiary hearing in 
 
 214. Id. (noting that “[i]f any method of communication is reasonably calculated to pro-
vide [the defendant] with notice” it is “the method of communication which [the defendant] 
utilizes and prefers”). 
 215. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:70–2.11(a)(4)(ii) (2016) (requiring posted notice to be posted 
in a “conspicuous” manner). 
 216. Koster v. Sullivan, 160 So.3d 385, 388, (Fla. 2015) (holding that “the return of ser-
vice is the instrument a court relies on to determine whether jurisdiction over an individual 
has been established”). 
 217. Id.; 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 260 (2016). 
 218. Id. at § 262 (2016). 
 219. Id. at § 274 (2016) (discussing the process by which a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of service; but see id. at § 270 (2016) (discussing the presumption of sufficiency 
given to service by a state official, and removing it from challenge by extrinsic evidence). 
 220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(l)(1) Jurisdictions also permit a plaintiff to present evidence in 
addition to the server’s affidavit if service is challenged by the defendant. Crabtree v. City of 
Durham, 526 S.E.2d 503, 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). 
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court.221 This aspect of service of process legitimizes the methods used, and 
it allows the court to remain impartial and rule on any alleged service defi-
ciencies by relying on evidence of service.222 
Verification of service of process also provides certainty that the notice 
requirements have been met. For example, many states have sample form 
affidavits that describe the components of service.223 These forms create 
uniformity and minimize the chance that service will be performed in error. 
Intentionally insufficient service (or “sewer service”) is also curbed by the 
requirement that the person performing service must swear to the service in 
the affidavit.224 
In addition to requiring service to be supported by some proof (such as 
an affidavit), the service rules also ensure service can be verified by limiting 
who can perform service. Many jurisdictions require service to be performed 
by a sheriff, marshal, or other approved official. Other jurisdictions permit a 
broader group of individuals to perform service, including anyone over the 
age of eighteen.225 The only limit placed on the person performing service is 
that he or she must not be a party to the suit. This requirement serves to en-
sure that the individual performing service will be independent from the 
lawsuit, increasing the ease to question this individual in court on a matter 
that should be separate from the merits of the underlying lawsuit.226 
When service is performed via mail, the preference for registered or 
certified mail also demonstrates a preference for service that can be offered 
along with the server’s affidavit as proof of service.227 For ordinary mail, 
most states require the sender to submit an affidavit demonstrating where 
and when the mail was sent and acknowledge that the mail had not been 
returned as undelivered.228 
 
 221. Se. Termite & Pest v. Ones, 792 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (rea-
soning “where the contents of an affidavit supporting a defendant’s contention of insufficien-
cy of service would, if true, invalidate the purported service and nullify the court’s personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing before de-
ciding the issue”). 
 222. 62B AM. JUR. 2D Process § 208 (2016). 
 223. For an example of a forum that permits the server to affirm to service via social 
media. See Serving Papers, UTAH COURTS, https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/service/service_ 
of_process.html (last visited June 23, 2016). 
 224. Some jurisdictions permit the party injured by a false affidavit to bring a claim 
against the affiant. State ex rel. Seals v. McGuire, 608 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Mo. 1980). 
 225. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). 
 226. Credibility is not in question and you do not have to make a party testify and raise a 
challenge to his credibility. 
 227. In re Cox, 244 S.E.2d 733, 735 (N.C. App. 1978). 
 228. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 417.10(e) (West 2016) (when service is permitted, in 
part, by ordinary mail, the server is required to submit “an affidavit showing the time and 
place copies of the summons and of the complaint were mailed to the party to be served, if in 
fact mailed”). 
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4. Notice Must Provide Sufficient Access to the Summons and Com-
plaint 
As notice jurisprudence has evolved, the requirement that the method 
of service provide sufficient access to the summons and complaint has not 
been a focal point. Primarily this is because, until recent years, service of 
process was almost always reduced to hard copy form. As long as the ser-
vice of process provided the requisite components, it would sufficiently pro-
vide access to the materials necessary to achieve constitutional notice.229 In 
Mullane, the Court distinguished the components of notice; treating chal-
lenges to manner of service separately from challenges to the content of 
service.230 While these remain separate components, the method of service 
places potential encumbrances on the ability to access the content of service. 
When considering the appropriateness of the service method, the method 
should provide the contents of notice in a format that is both readable and 
facilitates the defendant’s ability to secure legal counsel.231 The challenges 
to readability are associated closely with the other concern regarding the 
format of notice—whether the format will facilitate assistance by legal 
counsel. At its core, the service of process can preserve the defendant’s op-
portunity to be heard only to the extent it allows him to present a defense to 
the claims brought against him. In order to seize his opportunity to be heard, 
the defendant will need to be able to provide the summons and complaint to 
his lawyer. 
IV. EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
NOTICE 
After examining the accepted principles underlying the constitutional 
jurisprudence of notice, this section turns to a discussion of how changes in 
technology pose challenges to, along with new opportunities for, providing 
notice to defendants. Each underlying principle is discussed in light of the 
operation of social media in turn. Finally, this section examines some prag-
matic considerations that support the use of social media as a service of pro-
cess method.  
 
 229. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Often the 
required materials include the summons and complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 4. 
 230. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 231. See Schreck, supra note 147, at 1140 (discussing the challenges with electronic 
discovery, including the limits on sending and receiving files); Tamayo, supra note 147, at 
229 (discussing the limits in transferring files). 
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Technology has radically altered the way in which we communicate 
and receive important information.232 At the time of Mullane, the only meth-
ods for transmitting service of process consisted of in-hand service of pro-
cess, mail, publication in a printed newspaper, and posting on physical 
structures. The advance of communication through electronic methods cre-
ated entirely new ways to communicate with others, and significantly altered 
some of these traditional methods. For example, when information became 
digital we could track its transmission. There are now ways to verify mes-
sages are delivered by an independent electronic receipt.
 233 Additionally, we 
can verify the identity of the online users.234 Finally, with the advent of mo-
bile devices and their widespread use in our culture, we can more easily 
direct communications to an individual.235 This section addresses each of the 
principles previously identified and analyzes how these norms would be 
applied to service through social media.  
To date, most courts have addressed newly proposed methods for 
achieving notice by focusing on the specific technology being used, while 
neglecting to look at these overarching principles.236 At a minimum, there 
 
 232. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of technology 
on communication). A 2014 study conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 
[r]oughly two-thirds (64%) of U.S. adults use Facebook, and half of those users 
get news there—amounting to 30% of the general population. YouTube is the 
next biggest social news pathway—about half of Americans use the site, and a 
fifth of them get news there, which translates to 10% of the adult population and 
puts the site on par with Twitter. Twitter reaches 16% of Americans and half of 
those users say they get news there, or 8% of Americans. And although only 3% 
of the U.S. population use reddit, for those that do, getting news there is a major 
draw–62% have gotten news from the site. 
Monica Anderson, et al., How Social Media is Shaping News, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 
2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/24/how-social-media-is-reshaping-
news/. 
 233. See Adam Zuckerman, How to: Use google docs to Stealth Read Receipt, SOCIAL 
MEDIA TODAY (May 11, 2011) http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/how-use-google-
docs-stealth-read-receipt (discussing how to encode a read receipt into any file to track when 
it is read); Hannah Jane Parkinson, Message Read. But what kind of weirdo keeps read re-
ceipts on?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015 
/aug/17/message-read-but-what-kind-of-weirdo-keeps-read-receipts-on (discussing the vari-
ous ways social media captures automated “read receipts” and how to disable these features). 
 234. See Tilo Kmieckowiak, How to Verify Your Social Media Accounts, SOCIAL MEDIA 
ANALYTICS BLOG (March 1, 2016) https://www.quintly.com/blog/2013/08/how-to-verify-
your-social-media-profiles/ (discussing how to verify a social media account to prevent oth-
ers from using your persona). 
 235. See Anderson, supra note 10 (discussing use of mobile devices in the U.S. today); 
see also Caddie Thompson, Social media apps are tracking your location in shocking detail, 
BUSINESS INSIDER: TECH, (May 28, 2015) http://www.businessinsider.com/three-ways-social-
media-is-tracking-you-2015-5 (discussing how various social media apps on mobile devices 
utilize GPS location information). 
 236. See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the evolution of electronic service of process). 
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has been inconsistent application of prior constitutional theories in the con-
text of new technology. As a result, courts and legislators have utilized an 
unnecessarily constrained approach when considering new methods for 
achieving notice.237 This limits the ability of our legal system to better re-
flect the way in which people become apprised of important information. 
Consequently, by limiting notice to more traditional modes of communica-
tion, we may be eliminating possible methods for service that are more like-
ly to reach certain defendants while professing to protect the right to know 
of one’s opportunity to be heard in court. Conversely, simply because a new 
social media platform has grown in popularity, does not mean that it will 
provide constitutionally sufficient notice for all defendants. The operation 
and typical use of social media platforms must be analyzed to ensure that 
they would provide constitutional notice. This section seeks to expand the 
dialogue surrounding new technologies by closely analyzing communication 
through social media and highlighting areas where the operation of social 
media creates tension with the principles of Mullane. 
A. How Social Media Impacts the Ability to Direct Notice to the Defend-
ant 
One key principle underlying notice is that it must be directed to the 
correct defendant. As previously discussed, this has two aspects: that the 
notice must be provided to the correct defendant and be sufficiently directed 
at him as an individual.238 
1. Is the Notice Directed at the Correct Defendant? 
Social media creates challenges and provides new opportunities to en-
sure that service of process reaches the correct defendant. The first challenge 
is the possibility the account being served is a fictitious or fraudulent ac-
count.239 To create an individual account, most social media platforms re-
quire a person to provide an email and some basic identifying infor-
mation.240 The account holder typically has to agree to the user policy, 
 
 237. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unor-
thodox”). 
 238. See supra Section III.B.1. 
 239. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 (rejecting Facebook as a method for service, in 
part, because of the possibility that “anyone can make a Facebook profile using real, fake, or 
incomplete information”). 
 240. Signing up with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/100990 (last 
visited June 23, 2016); How do I sign up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/188157731232424 (last visited June 23, 2016); Getting 
Started, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/about/getting-started (last visited 
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which typically forbids the creation of an account for an improper pur-
pose.241 However, because there is no method to ensure that the person cre-
ating the account is, in fact, who he says he is, using the account to achieve 
service of process creates a risk that the notice will not be provided to the 
actual defendant. 
While this might be seen as a troubling phenomenon, further investiga-
tion into fraudulent accounts minimizes the concern. Facebook, the most 
popular social media platform, reports that anywhere from 5.5% to 11.2% of 
Facebook profiles are “fake.”242 However, many accounts are labeled “fake” 
by Facebook because they do not comply with the Facebook account 
rules.243 For example, an account is considered fake if the creator misclassi-
fies the account.244 Such accounts are typically created for things like a fami-
ly pet—while obviously running afoul of the Facebook rules, these types of 
accounts would not create the kind of concern envisioned by courts that 
have rejected the prospect of serving a defendant via social media.245 
Accounts created to mirror those of actual adults are more troubling.246 
These accounts are particularly troublesome because of the anonymity af-
forded to the account holder—the fraudulent creator can operate behind the 
web, at a keyboard. Fraudulent accounts are often created by using photos 
and information from a real account, though they often are hosted on 
webpages with odd links containing misspellings to avoid Facebook securi-
ty.247 
Fraudulent accounts created as a mirror of a real person are typically 
created to either phish for information from the real account holder’s con-
nections on the social media platform248 or are created to fraudulently influ-
 
June 23, 2016); Creating an Account & Username, INSTAGRAM, 
https://help.instagram.com/182492381886913/ (last visited June 23, 2016); Signing Up to 
Join LinkedIn, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/2964/~/signing-
up-to-join-linkedin (last visited June 23, 2016). 
 241. See Facebook User Agreement, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms (last 
visited June 23, 2016). 
 242. Emil Protalinski, Facebook estimates between 5.5% and 11.2% of accounts are fake, 
THE NEXT WEB (Feb. 3, 2013) http://thenextweb.com/facebook/2014/02/03/facebook-
estimates-5-5-11-2-accounts-fake/#gref. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. Approximately, 0.8 percent to 2.1 percent of the “fraudulent” accounts fit this 
category. Id. 
 246. See Id. Of the remaining “fraudulent” accounts, only 4.3 percent to 7.9 percent of 
accounts were duplicates of an individual account, and not all of these were created with an 
intent to create a “fraudulent” account. Id. 
 247. Beware of Socially Engineered Phishing Attacks on Facebook, FACECROOKS (Aug. 
1, 2012) http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/beware-of-socially-engineered-phishing-attacks-
on-facebook.html/ 
 248. Id. 
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ence the way social media analytics work.249 For example, interested parties 
who want to artificially enhance how information or news trends on some 
social media platforms will use numerous fictitious accounts to react to the 
social media page, driving the analytical tool.250 On Facebook, fake accounts 
have affected the popularity of Facebook pages by generating enormous 
numbers of fake “likes” on those pages.251 Fraudulent accounts, whether 
created to phish for information or generate false analytics, generally do not 
operate similar to real accounts.252 Therefore, while the existence of fraudu-
lent social media accounts should be considered when carefully crafting a 
service rule, the mere presence of some fictitious accounts should not oper-
ate as a prohibitive bar on the use of the social media platform as a method 
of service. 
Even when one considers service of process via in-hand service, there 
is always the possibility that the person served is the not the actual defend-
ant. Most service providers, who lack first-hand knowledge of the defend-
ant’s identity, find ways to ensure that the person being served is the named 
defendant.253 However, the named defendant might not be the one who actu-
ally accepts service. The challenge in a system embracing service via social 
media is that the traditional approaches used by servers performing in-hand 
service of process to verify the identity of person accepting service are not 
applicable. For example, a process server may call out the name of the de-
fendant when providing in-hand service to see if he responds—obviously 
this is not possible on a social media platform.254 
Additionally, we have endorsed service provided to a co-resident at the 
defendant’s dwelling. This form of service provides alternative assurances 
that the correct defendant will be served. First, the service must be provided 
to the defendant’s known permanent dwelling.255 Even when we identify the 
correct dwelling, we do not require service on the defendant himself because 
we accept that the forum is sufficiently identified with the defendant and the 
 
 249. Jennifer Abel, Like-Farming Facebook Scams: Look Before You Like, CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS (April 22, 2015) https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/like-farming-facebook-
scams-look-before-you-like-042215.html. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.; Beware of Socially Engineered Phishing Attacks on Facebook, FACECROOKS 
(Aug. 1, 2012) http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/beware-of-socially-engineered-phishing-
attacks-on-facebook.html/ 
 253. How to Identify Someone Who May Be Evading Service, SERVER-NOW (March 9, 
2011) http://www.serve-now.com/articles/18/evading-process-server. 
 254. Id. It would be hard to catch the online fake account holder “off guard” with a post-
ing, like yelling to someone in a public place. 
 255. See supra Sections II.B.1.b, III.B. 
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person provided with service will be inclined to provide the service to the 
defendant.256 
Verification of the defendant through a social media platform could be 
analogized to ensuring the defendant receive service via service on his 
dwelling. In the context of social media, for defendants with regular sub-
stantial use of a social media account,257 the account is more like the defend-
ant’s virtual “dwelling.” The platform, like the resident in a physical dwell-
ing, operates as a reliable agent forwarding the information received in the 
account to the defendant. 
Through analogy to service via a defendant’s physical dwelling, the 
service rules can be modified to ensure that service provided via social me-
dia reaches the named defendant. The account should have the hallmarks of 
a “dwelling.” It should contain information known to be associated with the 
defendant, such as a known email address and personal identifying infor-
mation, along with photos of the defendant.258 To ensure the account is val-
id, the account can be examined for recognizable patterns of behavior.259 
Moreover, the social media account should be a place where the defendant 
“dwells” or can be regularly found by those who know him. The defendant 
should make regular and consistent use of the account, regularly receiving 
information there.260 If these attributes are present, notice directed to the 
defendant’s social media account would be directed at the correct defendant. 
2. Is the Notice Directed at the Defendant in his Individual Capaci-
ty? 
More generalized methods of communication—like publication—are 
generally reserved for the less-favored back-up approach to service of pro-
 
 256. See supra Sections II.B.1.b, III.B. 
 257. See infra Section V (discussing the type of user that could be considered to have a 
virtual “dwelling”). 
 258. See Tabibi, supra note 141, at 56–7 (noting that “[A] party seeking to assure a court 
that a social media account belongs to a hard-to-find defendant may potentially have a treas-
ure trove of facts and information to present to a court to help authenticate an account” in-
cluding “photos, videos, relationship status, birthday, hometown, current city, education, 
work, languages spoken, and websites”). 
 259. By looking at patterns of behavior known to be associated with the defendant (such 
as prior communications on social media with the parties to the lawsuit) or connections be-
tween the defendant’s account and other users known to associate with the defendant, the 
account can be verified. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(using defendant’s prior communications as a basis for verifying the account); F.T.Comm’n. 
v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 
2013) (using known connections on defendant’s Facebook account as a basis for verifying the 
account). 
 260. See infra Section IV.B. (analyzing the level and nature of activity on a social media 
account that would support providing notice via social media). 
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cess. In other words, only when the notice cannot be directed to the individ-
ual through more traditional methods, will the court consider these construc-
tive forms of service. This bears on the use of social media as a method to 
perform service of process because most platforms have aspects that provide 
more individualized methods of communication and other aspects that pro-
vide more generalized information sharing. 
The first way in which social media platforms differ from more tradi-
tional ways of receiving information is that most social media platforms 
have two pathways for receiving information—individualized paths that 
allow for the transmission to and from a very limited group of people and 
more generalized pathways that allow for the transmission of information 
between the account holder and large groups of people. Individualized 
pathways can include private messaging offered on a variety of social media 
applications.261 Generalized pathways can include posting on a Facebook 
page or a Tweet linked to an individual’s Twitter handle.262 
In examining the more generalized pathways of transmitting infor-
mation via social media, it might be tempting to analogize the transmission 
of information to that of publication.263 However, this is not an apt analogy. 
Providing information to a defendant via publication has always been re-
garded as an ineffective means of service because of how unlikely it would 
be that the defendant would actually see the notice.264 After all, how likely is 
it that information posted in a generally circulating paper would come to the 
attention of any particular defendant? However, generalized social media 
posts are more directed. In fact, the unique ability to tag, link, or post in a 
 
 261. For example, under the current operation of Twitter, a user can send a direct mes-
sage to anyone regardless of whether the user sending the message follows the other user or 
not. However, if the recipient of the message does not follow the sender, the recipient will 
only receive the message if they have selected the “Receive Direct Messages From Anyone” 
in their “Security and Privacy” settings. About Direct Messages, TWITTER HELP CTR., 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606?lang=en (last visited June 24, 2016). Similarly, the 
current operation of Facebook includes direct messaging. By default, any Facebook account 
holder can send any other Facebook account holder a message. The message may be filtered 
into a separate file until the recipient accepts the message. Sending a Message, FACEBOOK 
HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/326534794098501/ (last visited June 24, 2016). 
Other social media platforms have various direct messaging capabilities, including LinkedIn, 
SnapChat, and Instagram. 
 262. How do I post on a Page that I visit? FACEBOOK HELP CTR., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/424946150928896 (last visited June 24, 2016); Posting 
Replies or Mentions, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/20169871 (last 
visited June 24, 2016). 
 263. See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 141, at 273 (drawing an analogy between Face-
book wall posts and publication in a newspaper and ultimately finding Facebook to be a more 
reliable method of conveying notice than publication). 
 264. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (criticizing 
notice through publication); see Eisenberg, supra note 54 (criticizing notice through publica-
tion). 
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way that associates the message with the intended recipient, is one of the 
advantages afforded by social media.265 It is this capability that has made 
these tools such powerful vehicles of spreading messages.266 This aspect of 
social media makes it more likely for messages sent through generalized 
pathways to reach the intended audience than through traditional publica-
tion. 
However, the more generalized pathways for communication via social 
media—like postings on a Facebook wall or a Tweet—are not as directed as 
traditional methods of service like in-hand service of process or service via 
one’s dwelling. While the defendant may instantly see a message posted 
through a generalized tool on social media (if, for example, he sees it on his 
mobile device after being instantly notified of the communication),267 the 
content might not be sufficiently directed at the individual defendant so as to 
bring home notice. Generalized messages may link the content to the in-
tended recipient, but may also link the same message to many people.268 
This diffuse aspect of social media poses possible challenges to its use as a 
vehicle for service of process. 
The high volume of messaging and the impact this volume has on how 
one receives information only adds to the diffuse nature of social media 
platforms.269 As discussed above, the social media platform might be most 
likened to one’s dwelling because it is tailored to the individualized account 
holder and is a place where he consistently returns to or can be found.270 
 
 265. See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (summarizing research 
on the social impact of social media). 
 266. See id. (summarizing research on how individuals use social media to interact with 
others); Lee Rainie, Social Media and Voting, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/11/06/social-media-and-voting/ (examining the impact of 
social media on voting behavior in the 2012 presidential election). 
 267. See Maeve Duggan, Mobile Messaging and Social Media 2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/mobile-messaging-and-social-
media-2015/ (examining the growing use of mobile apps to engage with social media). 
 268. For example, the use of a hashtag can connect a message to a trending topic. Assum-
ing a privacy setting was not used, all those following the hashtag can view the message. See 
Using Hashtags on Twitter, Twitter, https://support.twitter.com/articles/49309 (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2016); How Do I Use Hashtags?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com 
/help/587836257914341?helpref=faq_content (last visited Oct. 19, 2016); Who Can See My 
Posts When I Use Hashtags?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/134343 
280099148?helpref=faq_content (last visited Oct. 19, 2016). 
 269. It is estimated that every 60 seconds there are 243,000 photos shared, 50,000 links 
shared, and 3 million likes on Facebook. Just One Minute on Facebook, WE ARE SOC. MEDIA 
(June 11, 2014), http://wersm.com/just-one-minute-on-facebook-infographic/; see also Social 
Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (reviewing the way “power users” engage with social 
media). 
 270. See supra Section II.B.1.b (discussing the service on physical dwellings). 
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However, unlike providing information to a person by serving an approved 
resident at his dwelling, providing information to a defendant via his social 
media platform does not assure transmission of the service in that same way; 
it is less certain the served “resident” will provide the service to the defend-
ant. For example, when a plaintiff provides service at the defendant’s physi-
cal dwelling by serving someone who resides at the dwelling, there is gener-
ally some assurance that the service will reach the defendant because there 
are, presumably, a limited number of people who reside at the dwelling and 
a limited source of information flowing to the defendant in this manner. 
When the resident is served, he is alerted to the importance of the infor-
mation and we are comfortable that he will pass the notice on to the defend-
ant. 
A “virtual” dwelling on social media, however, differs in key ways 
from a defendant’s physical dwelling. First, there are multiple “residents” at 
the dwelling. For example, there are generally several possible pathways for 
generalized communications, from direct postings on a person’s account,271 
to a variety of ways to link someone to a message or image.272 The more 
“residents” at the home, the more concern that the defendant will miss the 
communication. Even more problematic is the amount of messages coming 
through these “residents.” There might be unlimited numbers of social me-
dia users who can create posts or send generalized messages that are associ-
ated with the account holder. To handle the volume of information, most 
social media pages employ sophisticated analytics to judge the significance 
of more generalized posts on the account.273 While there is a perception that 
service made on a resident at the defendant’s physical dwelling will find its 
way to the hands of the defendant, the flow of information on social media 
is more difficult to predict. 
By contrast, the individualized communication pathways present on 
social media provide a highly directed form of communication. In these 
routes, the message is sent directly to the account holder.274 Oftentimes, 
these messages are not filtered by the social media platform, which creates a 
highly individualized and direct path of communication. However, social 
media platforms have employed filters that limit this type of access to the 
 
 271. An example of this communication include posting on another person’s Facebook 
wall. 
 272. Examples of this communication include linking or tagging another person’s social 
media account in an image or post shared on any social media platform. 
 273. For example, Facebook controls the messages that are displayed in the account hold-
er’s “news feed.” How does News Feed decide which stories to show?, FACEBOOK: HELP 
CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/166738576721085 (last visited June 24, 2016). 
 274. See generally Protalinski, supra note 242. 
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account holder (even without the knowledge of the account holder).275 
Therefore, while most social media platforms provide a highly individual-
ized and direct path of communication to an account holder, the actual oper-
ation of the platform should be considered before carte blanc acceptance of 
it as a method for service of process. 
For these reasons, courts and legislators should endeavor to look at the 
distinguishing features of social media platforms—how they offer unique 
forms of communication different from traditionally accepted methods for 
service of process—and consider their operation in connection with the goal 
of providing notice. First, service rules and orders providing for service of 
process via social media should have as a key component some mechanism 
to verify the identity of the defendant as the social media account holder.276 
Second, there should be some assurance that the message is delivered 
through a sufficiently individualized path and no known blocks have been 
added to prevent delivery of service.277 
B. How Social Media Impacts the Conspicuousness of Notice 
Despite initial resistance, the legal system has begun to embrace the 
use of electronically stored information and has permitted once formalized 
events to occur through less-formal electronic means.278 Namely, the federal 
courts279 and several state courts280 have moved to a system of e-filing for 
court documents. Within these systems, courts have embraced the electronic 
service of documents other than the complaint. In addition, discovery rules 
have been amended to account for the storage and maintenance of relevant 
 
 275. How can I check if I have message requests on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., 
https:// www.facebook.com/help/936247526442073 (last visited June 24, 2016) (explaining 
the filtering of messages). 
 276. See infra Part V (providing a legislative proposal for a default option for social me-
dia service of process); see also Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 805–06 (discussing using “pic-
tures, personal information such as birth date and name, and even crosscheck lists of Face-
book friends with the defendant’s known associates”); and Tabibi, supra note 141, at 56–57. 
 277. See infra Part V (providing a legislative proposal that mandates “conspicuous” post-
ings and requires a confirmation of delivery). 
 278. See Roger Winters, Controversy and Compromise on the Way to Electronic Filing, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 125–127 (2005), http://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/re 
f/collection/tech/id/586. 
 279. Electronic Filing (CM/ECF), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtrecords 
/electronic-filing-cmecf (last visited June 24, 2016). 
 280. See Rob Tricchinelli, State courts continue move toward electronic filing, docketing, 
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Summer 2013), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-
media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-summer-2013/state-courts-
continue-move-. 
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information in a purely electronic format.281 These changes have been 
brought about for pragmatic reasons—namely, the ease and efficiency af-
forded by electronic distribution of information.282 However, electronic 
communication would not be embraced in e-filing or in e-discovery if it 
were perceived that the significance of these electronic communications 
would escape those involved in the process.283 The fact that electronic com-
munication has been embraced as a part of these legal processes lends sup-
port to extending recognition of service of process through newer electronic 
means.284 Therefore, service methods that, as a practical matter, sufficiently 
apprise the defendant of his need to seize his opportunity to be heard, should 
be considered constitutional even though they lack traditional or formal in-
dicia of conspicuousness. 
There are some practical limitations on the conspicuousness of infor-
mation shared through social media that must be addressed before it can be 
embraced as a method for service of process. First, most social media plat-
forms operate in a manner that may actually serve to bury the information 
distributed through it.285 Some information may be immediately brought to 
the attention of the user while other information may be relegated to a 
placement on the platform (akin to a spam folder in an email system) that is 
less likely to be noticed by the intended recipient.286 Even information 
shared through more direct pathways (such as a private messaging) can be 
filtered away from the account holder’s immediate view.287 
Moreover, the account holder himself can establish filters to prevent 
communication from certain individuals or from non-pre-approved individ-
uals.288 Even beyond platform-imposed or account-user-selected filters, the 
sheer volume of content shared on social media platforms limits the con-
spicuousness of any individual message. When notice could be communi-
 
 281. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (defining the scope of discovery to account for the 
challenges attendant to electronically stored information). 
 282. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 58–59, 73–74 (discussing the movement to e-filing in 
federal court). 
 283. Id. at 56–57. 
 284. Id. at 73–74. 
 285. As discussed, posts on more generalized information sharing pathways (such as 
posts or Tweets which can be generated and viewed by many people) are often filtered by the 
platform itself. See How do I post on a Page that I visit? FACEBOOK HELP CTR., 
https://www.facebook.com/help/424946150928896 (last visited June 24, 2016). 
 286. Id. Even placement on the social media platform, such as at the bottom of a long list 
of posts, may prevent it from being seen. 
 287. Many social media platforms filter even private messages when the account holder 
does not have an established connection or pattern of communication with the sender. 
 288. For example, an account holder on Facebook can alter the settings on the account to 
prevent filtering or to prevent other users getting access to the account. Basic Privacy Set-
tings & Tools, FACEBOOK HELP CTR. https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/ 
(last visited June 24, 2016). 
2016] "HACKING" SERVICE OF PROCESS 601 
cated as part of a flurry of messages, the notice is not likely “to attract the 
[recipient’s] attention to the proceeding.”289 
Finally, electronic notice presents a unique challenge to conspicuous-
ness; users may fail to open, or receive, notice transmitted on social media 
out of a generalized fear of receiving electronic files from users unknown to 
them.290 Even when messages containing files are not filtered out by the 
account holder, the account holder may be leery in opening a message be-
cause of the popularly-held belief that messages from unknown senders are 
likely to contain corrupted files.291 While there is always the fear that the 
defendant might not accept service being provided him, the defendant might 
have a legitimate reason to reject opening or accepting service sent via an 
electronic method. For this reason, there must be a sufficient mechanism to 
prevent the defendant from taking steps to evade service while providing for 
alternative service options when there are concerns that the defendant may 
not have received service due to a legitimate fear of opening a file.292 
Despite these recognized impediments to conspicuousness inherent in 
service of process via social media, there are some features of social media 
that would make notice delivered through it more conspicuous than that 
delivered through more traditional methods. Social media platforms are of-
tentimes accessed via mobile devices, meaning that the defendant could be 
served anywhere.293 Additionally, most mobile devices have applications 
that instantly notify the user when a social media posting or message has 
been sent.294 Again, while users can alter their devices to prevent instant 
notifications, the possibility of instant notification is typically not possible 
when service is provided through mail, service on defendant’s dwelling, by 
posting, or by publication. 
Moreover, service via social media can be approved in such a manner 
as to ensure that the notice will be sufficiently conspicuous so as to apprise 
the defendant of his rights. For example, the service rules or order could 
target users who have patterns of behavior suggesting they will likely re-
ceive notice in this manner.295 Users who have strong patterns of use of the 
social media tool—through frequent and regular use of the tool in sending 
and receiving information—are more likely to find notice sent via that tool. 
 
 289. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950). 
 290. Schreck, supra note 147, at 1136–1138. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See infra Part V proposing a mechanism to provide alternate service when a defend-
ant’s receipt of the service is not apparent from behavior or automated transmissions. 
 293. See Anderson, supra note 10 (discussing use of mobile devices in the U.S.). 
 294. See Facebook Mobile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mobile/ (last visited 
October 20, 2016); Notifications on mobile devices, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/artic 
les/20169887 (last visited October 20, 2016). 
 295. See infra Part V (proposing a defined user on whom social media service could be a 
default option). 
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Additionally, the service rule or order could require the confirmation of the 
receipt of notice.296 This could be obtained through behavior of the recipient. 
The commenting, forwarding, responding to, or even deletion of the mes-
sage297 containing appropriately and conspicuously designated notice, could 
serve as a method of verification that the notice was received and is suffi-
ciently conspicuous. To the extent the social media tool provides an 
acknowledgement that a message is read by the recipient, it would serve as a 
means to ensure the notice is conspicuous. Alternatively, the service rule or 
order could mandate the use of an additional traditional method of service of 
process if, after a designated period of time, the content of the notice is not 
acknowledged. 
C. How Social Media Impacts the Verifiability of Notice 
One primary concern by those reluctant to embrace service through so-
cial media is the concern that the platforms are inherently unreliable.298 
There is growing data that demonstrates the wide-spread use of these tools 
as an important source of information for a growing number of people.299 
One challenge is the lack of familiarity many judges and lawmakers have 
with the functionality of these tools—300enhancing the skepticism of their 
use in a key aspect of legal process. Additionally, the fast-paced evolution 
of social media platforms out-paces the rate of changes in our law. Deci-
sions or rules reliant on a particular feature of the social media quickly be-
come irrelevant or unworkable. 
 
 296. See Knapp, supra note 141, at 578 (noting that service via Facebook is more reliable 
than publication because receipt of notice can be verified through a read receipt). 
 297. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 74 (arguing that the “very act of deletion [of electronic 
service of process] would validate the fact that the defendant was aware of being served”). 
 298. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 at *4 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 20, 2014); F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 
841037, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013). 
 299. One recent reported stated: 
Roughly two-thirds (64%) of U.S. adults use Facebook, and half of those users 
get news there—amounting to 30% of the general population. YouTube is the 
next biggest social news pathway—about half of Americans use the site, and a 
fifth of them get news there, which translates to 10% of the adult population and 
puts the site on par with Twitter. Twitter reaches 16% of Americans and half of 
those users say they get news there, or 8% of Americans. And although only 3% 
of the U.S. population use reddit, for those that do, getting news there is a major 
draw–62% have gotten news from the site. 
Monica Anderson & Andrea Caumont, How Social Media is Reshaping News, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014) http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/24/how-
social-media-is-reshaping-news/. 
 300. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711, fn.1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting 
that members of the New York State judiciary were not likely to be among the 157,000,000 
people who check their Facebook accounts daily). 
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When one looks past these initial reservations it is clear that the law 
has never demanded a fool-proof method of service of process. The law has 
acquiesced to methods like service by mail even when documents sent via 
mail might be mislabeled, misdelivered, or even lost.301 Similarly, service to 
dwellings might be misplaced by the resident served or not ultimately pro-
vided to the actual defendant. Service via social media, which in some in-
stances may be more reliable than traditional methods of service, should not 
be outright rejected because it cannot assure actual notice.302 
Recognizing that service might be deficient has given rise to methods 
that verify the act of service. These verifications also provide courts with an 
independent source who can be examined in court under oath if service is 
later challenged. While using social media as an approved method for ser-
vice might not have widespread support in the legal community, there are 
ways to modify our current verification processes to ensure proper service. 
First, service by social media could be verified by affidavit in much the 
same way as other forms of service of process are verified. The service rules 
in Utah permit plaintiffs to move the court for service via publication or “by 
some other means” when traditional methods of service become impractica-
ble or when the defendant’s identity or whereabouts are unknown or when 
he avoids service.303 While the rule does not specifically address what is 
included in “other means,” the Utah courts have been permitting service via 
Facebook and Twitter for the past six years.304 To verify that the service 
occurred, the server must file an affidavit detailing the service, checking a 
box as to which social media tool (Facebook or Twitter) was used, and list-
ing the “name” of that account.305 
A similar approach could be used to verify service through any social 
media platform. To allay the concerns of those skeptical of service via social 
media, the affidavit could require more information than that required by the 
Utah form. For example, it could require the affiant to specify the method 
used to communicate the notice (e.g., whether the server used a generalized 
pathway of communication such as a wall post or a more individualized 
 
 301. Kevin W. Lewis, Comment, E-Service: Ensuring the Integrity of International E-
Mail Service of Process, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 285, 302 (2008) (noting that tradi-
tional “means of service have their flaws. The United States Postal Service is vulnerable to 
human error, resulting in lost mail and deliveries to wrong addresses. Notice by publication 
also carries imperfections because it can be misprinted.”). 
 302. See Hedges, supra note 35 at 67–68 (reasoning that traditional methods of service 
have “serious flaws” and yet are still considered proper methods for achieving notice; there-
fore, electronic service of process should not be held to higher standard). 
 303. UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4)(A). 
 304. See Irvine, supra note 61 (discussing the implementation of Utah’s alternative ser-
vice of process rule). 
 305. Id.; Proof of Alternative Service Form, UTAH COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/how 
to/service/docs/06_Proof_of_Alternative_Service.pdf (last visited June 25, 2016). 
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pathway of communication such as a private message). Additionally, the 
affiant could be required to specify how many times the service was distrib-
uted. The affiant could also be required to submit additional documentation 
in support of his affidavit—including screen shots of the posting and any 
screens that demonstrate the defendant received or opened the notice.306 
These methods would serve to verify the delivery of service and dimin-
ish the concern that courts or legislators adopting these methods were en-
dorsing categorically unreliable forms of service. Additionally, the court 
would be provided with an independent verification of service that could be 
tested in court should the service be challenged. 
D. How Social Media Impacts the Access to the Content of Notice 
Because technology necessitates transmission of information in an 
electronic medium, the notice must be sent electronically. Initially, concerns 
expressed around service of process via email focused on whether the in-
formation sent could be downloaded and read by the recipient.307 With the 
creation of portable document format (PDF) files, recipients can receive 
information in a manner that does not require he use the same software, 
hardware, or operating system as the sender. Most, but not all, social media 
platforms permit the sharing of PDF files. Alternatively, JPEG files, which 
can be used by capturing an image of the document, are also universally 
readable. These types of files may be transmitted on most social media plat-
forms.308 
 
 306. Examples could include dated screen shots of the defendant’s removal of the post, of 
the defendant’s comment on the post, or of the read receipt notification automatically dis-
played by the social media platform. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714 
(N.Y.Sup. Ct. 2015) (relying on the plaintiff’s affidavit and attachment of screenshot of 
communications on Facebook to order service via Facebook). 
 307. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 67 (discussing initial concerns raised by courts and 
others when service via email was first being considered). 
 308. The present capacities of Facebook and LinkedIn permit users to transmit infor-
mation via link or attachment of a wide variety of files, including PDF. How do I add an 
attachment to my message? FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/help/121288 
674619000 (last visited June 25, 2016); Attaching Files to Messages, LINKEDIN HELP, https:// 
help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/53703/~/attaching-files-to-messages (last visited 
June 25, 2016). Other social media platforms, such as Twitter, SnapChat and Instagram cur-
rently permit transmission of information via JPEG file. How do I use Instagram direct? 
INSTAGRAM HELP CTR., https://help.instagram.com/684926628219030 (last visited June 25, 
2016); Posting photos or gifs on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://help.instagram.com/684 
926628219030 (last visited June 25, 2016); Share saved photos from your device, SNAPCHAT 
SUPPORT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/photo-gallery (last visited June 25, 2016). 
Presumably, if a defendant is a regular user of a social media platform, he is able to read and 
exchange the types of files frequently found there. For example, a defendant would not make 
regular and consistent use of social media platform that only permitted exchange of JPEG 
files if he did not have the ability to download these files. 
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To avoid any concern about the format of notice, service of process 
could be more directly linked to the e-filing process already in use in many 
state courts and in the federal courts.309 Documents are already served be-
tween parties participating in these e-filing regimes. Service of process 
could simply convey information via PDF or JPEG, or it could include a 
link to the court e-filing system with information to direct the defendant to 
the case. 
In addition to the file format, the notice must also be capable of being 
provided to one’s legal counsel. One feature of some social media platforms 
is to “emulate the best parts of face-to-face conversation” by not storing 
information for very long after the recipient views the communication.310 
Obviously, if information is programmed to disappear not long after being 
viewed, this would pose a substantial impediment to the constitutionality of 
the notice. A defendant must be able to easily deliver the contents of the 
notice to his lawyer so that he can prepare his defense and seize his oppor-
tunity to be heard on the case. While recipients of electronic information can 
always preserve the communication they receive by taking a screenshot of 
the shared information, the onus should not be placed on the defendant to 
realize the need to create such content.311 Rather, service rules and court 
orders permitting service through social media should ensure that the meth-
od used does not have a default in which shared information is quickly 
erased after being used. 
E. Pragmatic Considerations Supporting the Use of Social Media as a 
Vehicle for Service of Process 
The majority of this section has made the argument that service 
through social media will provide notice that will meet the constitutional 
standard set forth in Mullane by upholding the integral principles of due 
process. Service of process via social media should also be embraced be-
cause it is a pragmatic solution that will ensure our legal system embraces 
efficient and affordable legal processes. 
First, the use of social media as a mechanism for service of process is 
more efficient than more traditional methods of service. Unlike in-hand ser-
vice of process, the defendant who regularly uses social media may not even 
 
 309. See Jennifer Lee Case, Note, Extra! Read All About It: Why Notice by Newspaper 
Publication Fails to Meet Mullane’s Desire-to-Inform Standard and How Modern Technolo-
gy Provides A Viable Alternative, 45 GA. L. REV. 1095, 1120-24 (2011) (recommending a 
court database be created to promote electronic service of process). 
 310. Chat 2.0, SNAP CHAT, http://snapchat-blog.com/post/141902878020/chat-20 (last 
visited June 25, 2016). 
 311. See Retrieve a copy of a snap, SNAPCHAT SUPPORT, https://support.snapchat.com/en-
US/a/snap-content (last visited June 25, 2016) (discussing the limitations of SnapChat). 
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need to be physically located.312 Many social media users receive updates to 
their mobile devices from their social media platforms, making it more effi-
cient to “locate” and serve the defendant. For those users who do not pos-
sess a mobile device or do not receive updates from their social media ac-
counts on their mobile device, location of the defendant is still more effi-
cient than through traditional service methods. A regular user of social me-
dia is likely to frequent the social media account and be “found” there. 
Second, service via social media is also less expensive than traditional 
methods of service.313 Service via in-hand personal service can be quite cost-
ly if the defendant is difficult to locate or if service must be attempted mul-
tiple times. Additionally, even service to a dwelling or service via mail, re-
quires the expense of employing a courier. At present, social media accounts 
are free to register for and dispatch with the need to have a paid courier ser-
vice. While service via social media might necessitate multiple service at-
tempts or require more by the server to ensure service is proper, these steps 
do not necessarily come with additional expense.314 Service via social media 
will likely save both the time and expense associated with delivery via pro-
cess server or via mail courier. 
Finally, social media should be approved as a mechanism for service 
because it is a reliable way to receive and transmit information. What is par-
ticularly noteworthy is that social media is a much more reliable source for 
information that pertains directly to the user. For example, an individual 
may be more likely to turn to his social media account to receive important 
updates about his personal network of friends or to retrieve messages di-
rected to him than to any other source. 
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
Having established that service of process via social media can meet 
the standard for constitutionality set out in Mullane, this section sets forth 
several legislative proposals designed to strike the delicate balance between 
providing an efficient and cost-effective method for service of process with 
the need to ensure adequate protection of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights. First, this section provides guidance to legislatures by offering rule 
language that creates an “automatic” avenue to service via social media, one 
 
 312. See Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(reasoning that electronic service of process permits service that is “aimed directly and in-
stantly” at the defendant). 
 313. See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (discussing 
the high costs associated with service via publication); Eisenberg, supra note 54, at 810-813. 
 314. If a private server is used, expenses might be associated with these additional steps; 
arguably, this would still be less expensive than service through traditional methods. 
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that permits service without prior court approval. Second, this section pro-
vides suggested rule language that creates intermediate legislative options, 
through waiver of service provisions and service through court order, which 
will serve to introduce social media as a method for service of process in a 
uniform way. Lastly, this section will provide direction to courts considering 
whether to grant a request to serve a defendant via social media under a cur-
rent “catch all” service provision. 
A. A Legislative Proposal for an “Automatic” Pathway to Service via So-
cial Media 
1. The Need for an “Automatic” Avenue 
Service via social media should be included as an “automatic” avenue 
to achieve notice because the principles underlying the constitutional re-
quirement for notice can be achieved through service via social media. As 
such, legislators should strive to provide a direct pathway to service via so-
cial media, free from any conditions or case-by-case court approval.315 By 
limiting service via social media to a “back-up” option, for use only when 
the traditional methods prove to be impracticable or impossible, or by re-
quiring prior court approval to serve defendants via social media, some of 
the inherent benefit of this service method is lost. Getting court approval 
requires additional litigation, including the drafting, filing and possible hear-
ing on a motion for alternative service, and its attendant costs. These ex-
penses, both in terms of effort and finances, are not insignificant. However, 
while there is a great need for efficient methods for service of process, these 
pragmatic considerations must yield to procedural mechanisms that are nec-
essary to ensure protection of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Conse-
quently, any approved “automatic” avenue must be both efficient and easy 
for the plaintiff to implement while providing adequate procedural safe-
guards to ensure protection of the defendant’s due process rights. 
2. Proposed Legislative “Automatic” Avenue to Service via Social 
Media 
The following proposed legislation integrates limitations on service via 
social media to ensure that it will be “reasonably calculated to inform” the 
defendant of the proceedings. As such, the proposed service rules in this 
section provide for service via social media without the need for prior court 
approval. 
 
 315. To date, no jurisdiction in the U.S. permits service of process via social media on 
individuals without prior court approval. 
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(a) Service via Social Media: An individual may be served by electronic 
communication of the summons, in a readily accessible format, to the de-
fendant’s qualifying social media account as defined in section (b). Ser-
vice made to the defendant’s qualifying social media account will consti-
tute valid service if the communication of the summons is made in a 
conspicuous manner and service is confirmed under section (c). Service 
is made in a conspicuous manner if it is likely to apprise a reasonable re-
cipient of the pendency of the hearing. 
(b)Qualifying Social Media Account: A qualifying social media account 
is any account: 
(i) operated solely by the defendant; 
(ii) accessed by the defendant on at least 15 of the 30 days 
immediately preceding communication of service under sec-
tion (a); and 
(iii) hosted on any communication platform designed to 
transmit information electronically that does not have a sys-
temic default operation of erasing shared information within 
the time period for confirmation of receipt under section (c). 
(c)Confirmation of Receipt of Service: Service under section (a) is con-
firmed through activity of the defendant that evidences receipt of the 
summons, including, but not limited to: postings, or other response, by 
the defendant, on the account served, referencing the content of the 
summons, postings, or other response, by the defendant, on any other ac-
count (including a different social media account, email account, or 
through other recorded communications), referencing the content of the 
summons; erasing of the summons that can be attributed to the defend-
ant; retransmission of the summons by the defendant; or the creation of 
automated electronic receipts confirming that the defendant accessed the 
summons or opened a link containing the summons. Confirmation of re-
ceipt of service must be made within 30 days of the delivery of service 
under section (a). If confirmation of receipt of service is not made within 
30 days of delivery of service under section (a), service of summons 
must be made via first-class mail to the defendant’s last known address. 
(d)Affidavit of Service: Proof of service must be made to the court 
through a server’s affidavit. The server must affirm to the best of the 
server’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry rea-
sonable under the circumstances: 
(i) the account served was a qualified social media account 
under section (b); and 
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(ii) that service was confirmed under section (c).
316
 
3. The Proposed Language Ensures the Service Will Be Directed to 
the Defendant 
To ensure that a service rule that permits service via social media with-
out the need for case-by-case court approval passes constitutional muster, 
the rule needs to ensure that service is provided to the correct defendant. 
Under section (b), the service must be made to a social media account “op-
erated solely by the defendant.” Because technology can obscure the identi-
fication of the defendant, the rule requires that the plaintiff take affirmative 
steps to verify that the account being served is that of the defendant. Specif-
ically, section (d) of the proposed rule mandates that the person accomplish-
ing service perform a “reasonable inquiry” into the identity of the account 
holder and requires that the server affirm in his affidavit that, “to the best of 
the server’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances,” the account served is operated by the 
named defendant.317 These are necessary steps for the server to be able to 
affirm that the account served was a “qualified social media account” under 
section (b) of the proposed rule. 
In addition to this affirmation, the service provision318 could require the 
server to provide detailed information about how the defendant’s identity 
was confirmed and append supporting documentation. Examples of infor-
mation could include the following: cross-reference to known information 
about the defendant (including personal information, background, and other 
electronic accounts known to be used by the defendant); images of the de-
fendants; virtual associations between the defendant and others known to 
associate with the defendant in real life; and patterns of behavior on the so-
 
 316. A jurisdiction adopting the proposed language would also need to determine the date 
by which service will be deemed to be made. To accommodate service via social media, 
current timing provisions might need to be amended. For example, service via social media 
may be considered made when confirmation of receipt of service is made by defendant action 
or by mail (whichever occurs later). See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 309 (McKinney 
2000) (designating the timing of service under snail and mail as being complete when the 
later of the posting or mailing occurs). Alternatively, service may be deemed made when the 
service of affidavit is filed. Regardless of approach, the jurisdiction should attempt to utilize 
current timing provisions to the extent possible. 
 317. This language mirrors that of FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Like Rule 11, this aspect of the 
proposal requires the affiant to make a reasonable inquiry before certifying the service in an 
attempt to dissuade fraudulent service. 
 318. This aspect of the proposal could also be accomplished through modification of the 
court’s forms for the server’s affidavit. 
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cial media tool by the defendant that can be corroborated as the defendant’s 
use.319 
In addition to requiring some process to verify the identity of the de-
fendant, section (b) of the proposed service rule requires that the account be 
operated “solely” by the defendant. Because many social media platforms 
enable multiple users to create jointly-held accounts,320 there is a chance that 
service made on the social media platform will not be sufficiently directed at 
the defendant. When service is made on an individual residing in the de-
fendant’s physical dwelling, the server must ensure that the dwelling is that 
of the defendant and that the person served also uses the dwelling as her 
own residence. Similar reasoning should apply to service on a social media 
account. Service must be directed to the defendant’s own account—just as 
service must be directed to the defendant’s own dwelling. However, unlike 
service on a dwelling, where the service can be provided to a joint-occupant, 
information delivered to a jointly held account cannot be presumed to be 
shared with the defendant, as it would be in a physical dwelling. There are 
less norms governing how people interact with each other when jointly shar-
ing a social media account than with people jointly occupying a dwelling. 
For example, it is unclear whether information delivered to the jointly 
owned social media account will be shared between the account-holders. 
Therefore, service under this statutory option, should not be made on an 
account known to be jointly held by more than one user. 
4. The Proposed Language Ensures the Service Will Be Conspicuous 
and Will Apprise the Defendant of His Opportunity to Be Heard 
To ensure that the service is “reasonably calculated to inform” the de-
fendant in this virtual forum, section (a) of the proposed service rule re-
quires service to be sufficiently “conspicuous.” Not every user of social me-
dia makes regular use of his account. The inconsistent use of social media 
by account holders warrants a more circumscribed rule when there is no 
judicial pre-approval of the service method. While others have suggested 
that service could be provided on any account (or electronic medium) that 
 
 319. Courts have considered these factors in approving service via email and or social 
media. Rio Properties v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2002); Li-
penga v. Kambalame, No. GJH-14-3980, 2015 WL 9484473, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 28, 2015); 
WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-CV-00526-AJT, 2014 WL 670817 at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 
2014); and F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 PAE, 2013 WL 841037, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2015).. 
 320. For example, Facebook permits “pages” that are used for groups such as businesses 
or brands. It can also be used by celebrities that want a different type of interactivity with 
fans. What is a Facebook page? FACEBOOK: HELP CTR., (last visited June 25, 2016), 
https://www.facebook.com/help/174987089221178. 
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was “accessed by the defendant within 60 days” of the delivery of service,321 
such a measure would not provide assurance that the service will be suffi-
ciently conspicuous to bring home notice in a “reasonably calculated” way. 
Service would be “reasonably calculated to inform” the defendant if the 
defendant makes regular use of the social media account. 
Because this article has argued that service on a social media account 
can be likened to service at one’s dwelling, the service rule should more 
closely mirror that form of service. Therefore, the account holder must uti-
lize his social media account in such a manner as to make it a place where 
he can regularly and reliably be found—something akin to his virtual dwell-
ing. For purposes of service on one’s dwelling, most service rules require 
that the dwelling be a “usual place of abode” or a “primary residence.”322 To 
be considered a “dwelling,” the defendant must be more than just “passing 
through.”323 In the context of a social media account, presence should be 
measured both in terms of frequency (e.g., how many days the defendant 
uses the account over a set period of time) and activity (e.g., how the de-
fendant engages with the account). To ensure the service rules adequately 
protect the defendant’s right to notice, the defendant should make frequent 
use of the page in a measurable way.324 Section (a) of the proposed service 
rule requires that the defendant make use of his account on fifteen of the 
thirty days immediately preceding the service. The types of activity that 
should count are any interaction with the account that demonstrates his use 
of the platform (including posting, sharing, commenting, deleting, or other-
wise reacting to content). The server is required to affirm, in his affidavit of 
service under section (d), that the defendant is this type of regular user. 
5. The Proposed Language Ensures the Social Media Account Has 
the Capacity to Bring Home Notice 
One challenge transmission of service via social media presents is that 
the content must be delivered in an electronic format. To minimize the 
chance that the defendant will not be able to access the actual electronic files 
that contain the summons and complaint, section (a) of the proposed service 
rule mandates delivery in a “readily accessible format.” This language fo-
cuses on the policy behind the rule—that the defendant should be able to 
easily access the contents of the service. The proposed rule uses flexible 
 
 321. Hedges, supra note 35, at 74–76. 
 322. Korpela, supra note 46 at §2(a) (summarizing service on the defendant’s dwelling). 
 323. Id. 
 324. See Melodie M. Dan, Social Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated Method to 
Effect Service of Process, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 183, 216–18 (2010) (rec-
ommending courts consider whether the defendant had logged onto his account within two 
weeks of the motion for alternative service of process). 
612 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38 
terms, rather than a specific file type, to account for the variety of ways this 
could be achieved. For example, the service could be provided in a univer-
sally readable format325 or in a format that is universally exchanged on that 
social media platform. If the defendant makes regular use of the platform, he 
should have ways to access the files regularly exchanged on the platform. 
Alternatively, a court using e-filing could modify the e-filing system to 
permit service of process. For example, the plaintiff could be required to 
provide the defendant with the information traditionally contained in the 
summons—the name of the court, the date by which defendant must respond 
and the consequence of failure to respond—and then provide a link to the 
summons and complaint in the court’s e-filing system.326 As drafted, the 
proposed language allows for many different types of electronic communi-
cation while still requiring that the service provided gives the defendant 
notice of his opportunity to be heard and permits him to deliver the notice to 
his lawyer to facilitate his ability to respond to the claims against him. 
Another challenge for service via social media is the potential that the 
social media platform has a default operation to automatically erase infor-
mation after it is viewed.327 There is always some concern that a message 
will be filtered, either by the platform or the account holder, to a less-
conspicuous part of the social media platform.328 These challenges can be 
addressed by putting confirmation safeguards in place that seek to ensure 
that the defendant receives the notice. However, platforms that are designed, 
by default, to erase information transmitted to the account holder, present 
unique constitutional challenges. For these platforms, unless the account 
holder takes affirmative steps to capture and save the information, it will be 
lost. Service provided through these channels is likely to be lost, minimizing 
the chance that the defendant will be apprised of his opportunity to be heard 
and eliminating his ability to transmit the notice to his lawyer. Therefore, 
section (b) excludes such platforms as acceptable vehicles for service of 
process. 
A final aspect of social media platforms that must be considered is the 
way in which information can be shared. Because many platforms have both 
generalized pathways (those which provide for information sharing in a 
 
 325. Service should be made through files that can be read regardless of the operating 
system, software, and hardware being accessed by the defendant. 
 326. See Case, supra note 309, at 1122–24 (recommending a court database to facilitate 
service via electronic service of process). 
 327. For example, SnapChat operates with a default operation that erases shared infor-
mation shortly after it is received by the recipient. Retrieve a copy of a snap, SNAPCHAT 
SUPPORT, (last visited June 25, 2016) https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/snap-content 
(discussing the limitations of SnapChat). 
 328. See supra Section V.A.2.d (discussing methods to ensure service is received by the 
defendant). 
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more public way) and individualized pathways (those which provide for 
information sharing between the sender and recipient only or between a 
small group of people), the service rule should aim to accommodate the var-
ious forms of operation while ensuring the notice is sufficiently conspicuous 
to apprise the defendant of his rights. This can be achieved in section (a) by 
requiring that the service be displayed in a “conspicuous manner” on the 
defendant’s social media account. Such a requirement permits a variety of 
transmissions while aiming to ensure the best option is chosen. For example, 
conspicuous service could include postings that most closely resemble pri-
vate messages, as these might alert the account holder of the message. Addi-
tionally, this could include posts to an account holder’s page, like his Face-
book wall, that were sufficiently prominent. Service that would not likely 
satisfy this standard would include the burying of the summons and com-
plaint in unrelated messaging. For example, service posted as a comment to 
other posts on an account holder’s Facebook wall would not be “conspicu-
ous” as there would likely be no distinguishing feature of such post to bring 
it to the attention of the account holder. Because a defendant could later 
challenge the “conspicuousness” of a posting, the plaintiff would have a 
sufficient incentive to transmit the service in a conspicuous manner. 
6. The Confirmation of Delivery Increases the Likelihood the De-
fendant Will Receive Notice 
As an additional safeguard to ensure service is sufficiently conspicu-
ous, section (c) requires that the service be verified in some manner, and if it 
cannot be verified within thirty days of service, that another method of ser-
vice be used as a backup. Under section (c), service is valid when there is 
some activity by the defendant that demonstrates his receipt of the service. 
This would operate similarly to limits placed on service via mail, which 
often require a signature upon delivery. Examples of activity which operate 
as a verification of receipt include comment on the service; forwarding or 
sharing of the service; electronically tracked receipt of the service (by a read 
receipt or the tracking of the opening of a link); and even deletion of the 
service by the defendant (so long as it was apparent that the deletion was 
due to an affirmative act of the defendant and not an automated response of 
the platform). 
In lieu of a verification of receipt via defendant conduct, section (c) re-
quires delivery of service via first class mail to the defendant’s last known 
address. To promote efficiency, this back-up option is required only when 
service cannot be confirmed via the defendant’s activity within thirty days 
after the service via social media is made. However, for jurisdictions that are 
more apprehensive about service via social media, this back-up option might 
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be required simultaneously with the service via social media.329 Notably, 
because the recommended back-up method is only first class mail, this addi-
tional step would not be overly cumbersome to the plaintiff nor operate to 
nullify the advantages of providing service via social media. 
B. Proposed Legislative “Non-Automatic” Routes to Service via Social 
Media 
This section presents additional legislative solutions for service of pro-
cess via social media. Unlike the initial proposal that permits service of pro-
cess as long as the conditions of the statute are met, these solutions condi-
tion service on pre-approval by the court or the consent of the defendant. 
For jurisdictions hesitant to embrace service of process via social media, 
these proposals may provide important intermediate steps towards achieving 
service of process via social media. Moreover, these proposals would be 
helpful in instances where the defendant is difficult to serve through tradi-
tional methods of service and does not otherwise meet the strict require-
ments of the proposed “automatic” route to service via social media. 
1. Proposed Legislation: Service Conditioned on Court Approval 
The following proposed service rule permits the plaintiff to move the 
court to order service of process via social media. 
(a)Motion for Substituted Service of Process via Social Media: Upon 
motion, a court may order service of process via a social media account, 
maintained by the individual defendant, and hosted on any communica-
tion platform designed to transmit information electronically, if the court 
determines that the proposed service is reasonably calculated to apprise 
the defendant of the opportunity to be heard after considering the follow-
ing: 
(1) whether the account is operated solely by defendant or in 
conjunction with others; 
(2) whether the defendant has made substantial prior use of 
the account; 
(3) whether the proposed communication of service would be 
sufficiently conspicuous, considering the defendant’s prior 
use of the account and the operation of the platform; 
 
 329. See Dan, supra note 324 at 216 (recommending that service via social media “should 
be supplemented with another inexpensive and reliable method of service, such as postal 
mail, to increase the likelihood that a defendant will receive notice of a lawsuit”). 
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(4) whether the defendant had accessed or used the account in 
connection with the underlying dispute; 
(5) whether the defendant’s receipt of the summons could be 
verified; and 
(6) whether service of the defendant through traditional 
methods would be impossible or impracticable. 
Under the proposed conditional service rule, a plaintiff may move the 
court to order service via social media. The proposed rule then mandates 
that the court consider a variety of factors330 when determining whether to 
grant a motion to serve a defendant via social media. The factors should be 
balanced together with no factor receiving more weight than any other. Ad-
ditionally, the court need not find that every factor would support the mo-
tion. Rather, the court should find that, on balance, the factors favor the use 
of a social media platform to provide service. The listed factors should be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the discussion included in Part IV of 
this article. 
Just as through the “automatic” route to service, the social media ac-
count must be that of the named defendant. However, unlike in the “auto-
matic” route, the court may order service to a social media account that is 
not operated solely by the defendant. The court must consider “whether the 
account is operated solely by defendant or in conjunction with others.” 
There may be instances where a defendant maintains a social media account 
with another person or persons, and there is good reason to believe the de-
fendant would learn of any service posted to the account. While these types 
of accounts would not qualify under the “automatic” service provision, a 
court could examine the attributes of the social media account and the use of 
the account by the defendant to ensure that service would reach the defend-
ant. 
 
 330. David Bell, Texas Bill Would Make Service via Facebook Law, HAYNES & BOONE 
BLOGS, (March 1, 2013) http://blogs.haynesboone.com/index.php/2013/03/firm/firm/texas-
bill-would-make-service-via-facebook-the-law/ (In 2013, Texas House Bill 1989 proposed to 
permit service via social media upon court approval. Texas House Bill 1989 provided the 
most guidance to courts of any proposal to date, directing courts to consider whether the 
defendant “regularly accessed” the social media account and whether the defendant “could 
reasonably be expected to receive actual notice” through service on the defendant’s social 
media account. Even Texas House Bill 1989, however, did not give specific guidance to the 
court on what “regular access” by the defendant would look like or how to assess the rea-
sonability of one’s expectation that the defendant would receive actual notice through the 
proposed service. Ultimately Texas House Bill 1989 was not enacted into law); see also, 
Tabibi, supra note 141, at 54–56 (discussing Texas House Bill 1989). 
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The defendant’s use of the account and the capacity of the platform 
must be considered. These factors ensure that courts determine whether the 
defendant is likely to be apprised of the service because he will be likely to 
visit and retrieve the service, and because the social media platform enables 
the service to be conspicuously displayed.331 A court can make this determi-
nation by considering the nature of the defendant’s “prior use of the ac-
count,” including “whether the defendant had accessed or used the account 
in connection with the underlying dispute.” As observed by courts that have 
permitted service via social media, when a defendant that has made use of 
social media on prior occasions, especially to communicate with the plaintiff 
or others in connection with the matters that form the basis of the case, there 
is reasonable assurance that the defendant will be made aware of the ser-
vice.332 After all, he has already “expressed” a preference for receiving im-
portant information (or at least information from the plaintiff) via this meth-
od. 
Several state “catch-all” service provisions permit a court to order ser-
vice through any method, so long as it comports with the Constitution. This 
proposal differs in significant ways from these “catch-all” provisions. First, 
unlike most “catch-all” provisions, the proposed language does not require 
the plaintiff to make a showing that service was not possible or practicable 
under traditional methods of service. While the proposal includes this as a 
factor to consider, the proposed rule does not require this initial showing. 
Some plaintiffs might need to resort to service via social media even 
when there are substantial reasons to believe the defendant will in fact re-
ceive the service. For example, a defendant might make regular use of his 
social media account, but have more clustered activity and not, therefore, 
have verifiable use of his account in fifteen of the last thirty days preceding 
the proposed service. While this would disqualify use of the proposed “au-
tomatic” route to service, the court could examine the defendant’s use of his 
social media account and determine that service would be “reasonably cal-
 
 331. When considering the capacity of the social media platform, the court should con-
sider whether it will permit for the exchange of information in a universally readable format 
or can permit the transmission of a link to the court’s e-filing system with the ability to obtain 
the information needed to apprise the defendant of his opportunity to be heard on the matters 
against him. Also, the court should consider whether the platform has a default mechanism 
that deletes shared information prior to the date by which the defendant must respond. 
 332. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (relying on 
defendant’s prior use of Facebook to communicate with the plaintiff to validate the defend-
ant’s Facebook account); F.T.Comm’n v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 
WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (considering the defendant’s prior use of email 
and Facebook before ordering service); see also Rio Properties v. Rio Int’l. Interlink, 284 
F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the defendant’s prior use of email as support for 
granting service via email). 
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culated to apprise the defendant” of his opportunity to appear and defend 
himself. 
By contrast, other plaintiffs may be inclined to motion the court for 
service via social media because, after considering all other methods of ser-
vice, it becomes clear that the defendant will be difficult to physically locate 
or that he is actively evading service. For these defendants, service via so-
cial media would be warranted because it is “not substantially less likely” 
than any other method to bring home notice. The proposed service rule must 
be sufficiently flexible to permit the court to order service via social media 
in either circumstance, as both are constitutionally sound. 
Second, the proposed factor-based test is superior to the traditional 
“catch-all” provisions as those provisions give little to no guidance to courts 
in determining whether service via social media is appropriate in a given 
case. With more guidance, the court can be assured that it has considered the 
unique constitutional challenges presented by service of process via social 
media. Additionally, requiring courts to consider listed factors creates con-
sistent treatment in the handling of motions for service via social media. 
This, in turn, promotes the development of a uniform application of this 
important due process right. 
2. Waiver of Service Provisions 
The final proposal in this section provides an opportunity to seek con-
sent from the defendant to service of process via social media. This specific 
proposal is fashioned off of the waiver of service provisions contained in the 
FRCP, though any state could adopt or modify a similar waiver provision. 
The federal waiver provision permits a plaintiff to request that the defendant 
waive his right to formal service of the summons.333 The plaintiff must de-
liver a copy of the complaint to the defendant along with the request to 
waive service and a prepaid method for the defendant to respond.334 Under 
this process, if the defendant agrees to waive formal service of the summons 
he gains additional time to answer and the plaintiff need not move forward 
with formal service.335 
It could be argued that the current FRCP waiver provisions already 
permit waiver to be delivered via methods such as social media. Arguably, 
FRCP 4(d)(1)(G), which states that the waiver may be delivered “by first-
class mail or other reliable means,”336 already includes delivery of the waiv-
 
 333. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d). 
 334. Id. at 4(d)(1)(C); see Wavier of the Service of Summons Form, U.S. Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/notice-lawsuit-summons-subpoena/waiver-service-summons, 
(last visited June 25, 2016). 
 335. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3). 
 336. Id. at 4(d)(1)(G). 
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er via social media. However, it is not clear if everyone agrees that social 
media constitutes a “reliable means” through which to deliver a request for 
waiver of process.337 At a minimum, the waiver rule should be clarified to 
dispel this confusion. 
Another wrinkle under the current waiver of service language in Rule 4 
is the requirement under subsection 4(d)(1)(C) that the request for waiver 
form must “be accompanied by a copy of the complaint, 2 copies of the 
waiver form appended to this Rule 4, and a prepaid means for returning the 
form.”338 Those who argue that social media is not an available method to 
deliver a request for waiver of service point to this provision, arguing that 
there is no process by which to deliver a prepaid means to deliver the signed 
waiver. 
The current waiver of service rules contained in Rule 4 could easily be 
modified to clarify that waiver of service can be accomplished via social 
media. First, Rule 4(d)(1)(G)339 should be modified to specifically include 
delivery via social media. For example, the provision should read: 
The notice and request must: . . . (G) be sent by first-class mail or other 
reliable means, including through social media or other reliable elec-
tronic methods of communication.
340
 
This additional language would remove any remaining doubt that so-
cial media provides a reliable means of delivery of the request for waiver of 
service. 
Second, a version of Rule 4(d)(1)(C) should be adopted which accounts 
for delivery of a request for waiver of service via a non-paper-copy method. 
For example, the current phrasing refers to the need to deliver two copies of 
the waiver form.341 Presumably, this is to allow the defendant to retain one 
copy for himself and to return the other to the plaintiff without carrying the 
burden of making extra copies. In a digital context, there is no burden asso-
ciated with making additional copies. Further, the reference to providing a 
prepaid means of returning the signed waiver to the plaintiff is because the 
 
 337. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 75 (recommending the FRCP be amended to clearly 
provide for delivery of the waiver of service be sent via any electronic means). 
 338. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(C). 
 339. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(G). 
 340. See Hedges, supra note 35, at 74–75. (proposing that waiver provisions should be 
expanded to permit transmission of the request to waive through any electronic means). This 
article proposes making delivery of the request to waiver possible via social media. However, 
a jurisdiction could adopt broad waiver provisions. There is less concern about the reliability 
of the method chosen for delivery of the request to waive service of the summons. The plain-
tiff must complete formal service if the waiver is not signed and returned by the defendant, 
incentivizing the plaintiff to choose the most reliable means available for delivery of the 
request to waive service. 
 341. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(C). 
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Rule was initially designed to operate in a paper-copy context. The prepaid 
return presumes that the defendant will use some form of mailing service to 
return the form to the plaintiff. With the ease by which a person can add his 
signature to an electronic document and send that document back to the 
plaintiff, the language needs to be adjusted to reflect the digital context. As 
long as the context does not create an additional burden (like the expense of 
mailing a signed waiver form to the plaintiff), it meets the spirit of Rule 4. 
To clarify the Rule and avoid any perception that it might prohibit the 
transmission of waiver of service via social media, the Rule should read as 
follows: 
The notice and request must: . . . (C) be accompanied by a hard-copy or 
digital copy of the complaint, 2 hard-copies or 1 digital copy of the 
waiver form appended to this Rule 4, and, if delivered in hard-copy, a 
prepaid means for returning the a hard-copy form. 
With these changes, Rule 4 would operate to provide for delivery of a 
waiver of service as it has when that waiver has been transmitted in hard 
copy. When delivered via social media, the defendant would still have the 
same time to return the signed waiver form. The digital waiver form signed 
by the defendant could be transmitted by any electronic method (including 
social media or email) or could be filed on the court’s e-filing system. To 
clarify the process and ensure that the plaintiff receives the signed waiver 
(and avoids the expense of attempting traditional service of process), the 
waiver of service form could be modified to include a provision where the 
plaintiff could designate how the signed form should be returned. For exam-
ple, the form could include a line that specifies where and how the signed 
waiver is to be returned, including appropriate links to the court e-filing 
system or to a designated email or social media account. Finally, the waiver 
of service process would continue to provide the incentives for the defend-
ant to waive, including additional time to file his answer and the potential 
award of costs when he refuses to waive in bad faith. The plaintiff would 
also continue to be obligated to turn to another method of service of process 
if the waiver is not returned in the designated time. 
C. Service of Process Under Current Catch-All Provisions 
Until such time as service rules can be adopted, which provide clear 
routes to service of process via social media, some states may continue to 
permit service via social media on a case-by-case basis under “catch-all” 
provisions. As discussed in this article, some states permit courts to fashion 
service methods on a case-by-case basis so long as the approved method 
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meets the Mullane test.342 While the court is empowered to reach its own 
decision on whether service via social media is warranted, they are often 
hesitant to grant these motions.343 Either courts deny the plaintiff’s request 
outright, or require some additional method of service be utilized simultane-
ous with the service via social media.344 The considerations raised in this 
article can be drawn upon to remove some of the uncertainty for courts wad-
ing into this new and uncertain terrain in notice law. 
Courts operating under “catch-all” service provisions should rely on 
the same factors identified in the proposed legislative provision articulated 
in Section V.A.3. of this article. Because plaintiffs in these jurisdictions are 
operating without a favored route to service of process via social media, 
courts should be mindful that the plaintiff may be motioning the court for a 
method of service that might be the most likely to bring home notice. As 
such, the court might consider whether the defendant would otherwise meet 
the strict requirements of the proposed “automatic” route to service of pro-
cess via social media set forth in this article. When faced with these facts, 
courts should not require additional service via alternate methods. Such a 
requirement creates an additional burden on the plaintiff while offering little 
additional protection for the defendant’s due process rights. 
VI. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION 
This section addresses some of the impediments a state might encoun-
ter when attempting to revise its current service of process rules to imple-
ment the proposed legislation offered in this article. In addition to raising 
these concerns, this section offers some suggestions to assist in the imple-
mentation of the proposed legislation. 
A. Lawyers, Judges, and Legislators May Not Be Familiar with the Opera-
tion of Social Media Platforms 
One challenge to the implementation of the proposed legislation is the 
lack of familiarity many lawyers have of social media platforms. In particu-
lar, lawyers and judges lack familiarity with the operation of newer forms of 
social media. Lawyers and judges may attribute this to ethical limitations 
 
 342. See supra Section II.B. 
 343. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, No. 11 CIV. 6608 JFK, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (noting that the request to permit service via Facebook was “unor-
thodox”). 
 344. F.T.Comm’n. v. PCCare247 Inc., No. 12 CIV. 7189 (PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (emphasizing the need to couple service via social media with ser-
vice by email). 
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imposed by a variety of local bar associations or state supreme courts on use 
of social media. In jurisdictions with more ambiguous ethics rules regarding 
the use of social media, the fear of possibly violating professional ethics 
rules may create a substantial disincentive for lawyers and judges to use, and 
thereby become familiar with, social media.345 When this understandable 
reluctance to use social media is coupled with the fast-paced evolution of 
these tools, the lack of familiarity becomes a true encumbrance for those 
seeking to have social media adopted as a method of service. Finally, there 
is a long-standing acceptance of service conveyed in a hard-copy form. Be-
cause lawyers have long embraced the significance of formal service, it may 
be difficult for them to embrace new (and less familiar) methods. 
To overcome the feelings of unfamiliarity, those seeking to encourage 
service via social media should ground the discussion in the principles of 
due process. By focusing on the underlying principles of due process, the 
decision on whether and how to implement service via social media will be 
premised on the constitutional right to notice and not on the operation of any 
particular social media platform. This serves to center lawyers and judges in 
more familiar territory and avoids the possibility that any proposed solution 
will be too dependent on a particular view of social media. Moreover, those 
advocating for service via social media should capitalize on the movement 
towards e-filing in the federal courts and in many state systems. As lawyers 
and judges begin to embrace an electronic system, they may be more in-
clined to embrace service via electronic medium. 
B. Limitations on “Who” Is Authorized to Provide Service 
One practical limitation to consider in using social media platforms as 
a vehicle for service is the accessibility of the account by a “would be” serv-
er. While anyone can register for an account on a social media platform, 
most platforms limit access to any individual account holder’s page. For 
example, account holders may need to accept or approve a request to inter-
act with the server before any information can be shared. Each social media 
platform operates in different ways; some require an approved connection 
before sharing of information via individual pathways (like private messag-
ing options) and others require an approved connection before sharing of 
 
 345. Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 n.2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (noting that 
members of the New York State judiciary were not likely to be among the 157,000,000 peo-
ple who check their Facebook accounts daily); see also John G. Browning, Keep Your 
“Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer: Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of 
Social Media, 3 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 204 (2013) (discussing the ethical 
challenges lawyers face when using social media in the context of litigation). 
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information on even more generalized pathways (like posts on a Facebook 
wall). 
Connected with this limitation is the limit placed on who may serve the 
defendant under the jurisdiction’s service rules. While many state service 
rules broadly define “who” may serve a summons on the defendant, some 
impose significant limitations requiring service to be made by a sheriff or 
licensed official. These types of limitations may minimize the efficiency 
offered by service via social media. For example, if a party needs to hire the 
sheriff or a private licensed server, it might be costly for the server to gather 
the information needed to validate the defendant’s social media account. In 
addition to generating extra expense, the process of validating a defendant’s 
social media account might prove to be too cumbersome for a sheriff (or 
other official server). 
In considering the adoption of the proposed legislation presented in this 
article, additional revision to a state’s service rules may be warranted. For 
example, the state could consider permitting more individuals to serve a 
summons via social media. To enhance the reliability of service by these 
individuals, the state could require more information to be provided in the 
affidavit of service and could encourage the enforcement of penalties for 
knowingly submitting a falsified affidavit.346 
Another hurdle to effectuating service via social media that might not 
be apparent when considering the language of the statute, is the practical and 
ethical limitations on “who” can serve a summons. Even in a state that per-
mits service by anyone over the age of 18 who is not a party to the suit, ser-
vice might not be possible by lawyers or others due to ethical limitations on 
their use of social media platforms. In states with broad service provisions, 
lawyers can perform service. However, restrictions placed on the lawyer’s 
use of the opposing party’s social media account may make this impossible. 
One can consider New York’s service rules to understand the potential 
hurdle ethics limitations pose to service via social media. New York’s ser-
vice rules permit any non-party over the age of eighteen to serve a defend-
ant, including an attorney.347 The New York State Bar Association’s Social 
Media Ethics Guidelines provide guidance on how a lawyer may review a 
person’s social media page; a critical step to serving a defendant through his 
social media account. While these guidelines explain that a lawyer may 
 
 346. In addition to contempt of court and statutory penalties, some jurisdictions recognize 
legal claims against the server. See Michael Geibelson, Serving Process on the Process Serv-
er, ROBINS KAPLAN BLOG, (Oct. 1, 1998), http://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/ser 
ving-process-on-the-process-server (discussing a wide range of penalties available when a 
server files a false affidavit). 
 347. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716 (ordering the attorney to perform service by accessing the 
plaintiff’s social media account). 
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view the public portion of a represented person’s social media account,348 
the lawyer may not view a private portion of the social media account unless 
the represented person has furnished an express authorization.349 Moreover, 
the lawyer cannot have another person access a represented person’s social 
media account in a manner that the lawyer is prohibited from doing him-
self.350 While the lawyer can request access to a private portion of an unrep-
resented person’s social media account, the lawyer must “use her full name 
and an accurate profile, and she may not create a different or false profile in 
order to mask her identity.”351 
In jurisdictions with more restricted use of social media accounts, a 
lawyer may not be able to provide service via social media because he (or 
his agents) might not be able to access the individual’s account to verify the 
account and receipt of service. While jurisdictions like New York provide 
more latitude to lawyers accessing unrepresented person’s accounts (a typi-
cal scenario when initiating a lawsuit),352 some revision to the access of so-
cial media accounts of represented person’s accounts may be warranted. To 
facilitate service via social media, ethics guidelines could be clarified to 
account for the access of the social media account for the limited purpose of 
serving the summons. For example, the ethics guidelines could specifically 
exclude a private server as an “agent” of the lawyer – disconnecting the 
server’s actions from the lawyer and enabling the private server to verify the 
account through access to private aspects of the account (like a private mes-
saging feature of the social media account). 
A related issue arises in jurisdictions that offer little to no guidance on 
how lawyers are to ethically use social media accounts of opposing parties. 
The lack of guidance acts as a deterrence to otherwise appropriate use of the 
defendant’s social media account. In such jurisdictions, the ethics rules 
should be clarified to permit lawyers to access public and private aspects of 
an unrepresented person’s social media account for the purpose of perform-
ing service of summons, so long as they do so in a manner that is not decep-
tive.353 
C. Potential for Abuse or Need to Limit Public Nature of Notice 
While service via social media provides an efficient and reliable meth-
od to serve many defendants, there are some situations where this method 
 
 348. Social Media Ethics Guidelines, N.Y. STATE BAR ASSN 15 (2015), 
http://www.nysba.org/socialmediaguidelines/. 
 349. Id. at 17. 
 350. Id. at 18. 
 351. Id. at 16. 
 352. Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 716. 
 353. See Browning, supra note 345. 
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might be abused by plaintiffs who are disinterested with providing defend-
ants with sufficient service. For example, courts may refuse to enforce 
waiver of service provisions in contracts when there is a power-imbalance 
between the contracting parties.354 This restriction on limiting service meth-
od options arises out of a concern that the landlord and tenant are not in 
equal bargaining power, such that the waiver of service or limitation on the 
method is not valid. States may identify other types of claims that raise simi-
lar concerns in the context of service via social media. Further, there are 
situations where the litigation process itself might be prone to abuse and 
statutes have been enacted to protect the rights of would-be defendants. For 
example, the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act could be interpreted to 
prohibit the collector from publically posting notice to a debtor on a Face-
book account.355 To account for these situations, the proposed legislative 
solutions contained in this article could include the following caveat clause: 
“unless state [or federal] law provides otherwise, an individual may be 
served. . . .” With such an exclusion, the jurisdiction would be able to limit 
the use of service via social media when it deems the balance to tip in favor 
of excluding this method. 
While the above examples focus on a jurisdiction’s desire to limit ser-
vice methods for a particular group of vulnerable defendants, there may be 
instances in which an individual plaintiff attempts to give flawed service via 
social media, rendering a particular defendant in need of protection. For 
example, the plaintiff might choose an inconspicuous place to post the ser-
vice on the social media account to obtain a default judgment. While the 
defendant can move to vacate the default judgment on the grounds that the 
notice was not compliant with the service rules, this can be a costly and un-
nerving process for the defendant. To prevent this type of conduct by plain-
tiffs, the service rule or statute could include a provision for the award of 
costs associated with a successful motion to vacate a default judgment when 
there is a finding that the service was provided in bad faith. These costs 
could be levied against the plaintiff and/or his legal counsel. Additionally, 
the penalties suggested above for knowingly filing a false affidavit of ser-
vice could be instituted. These penalties could act in concert to deter the 
party, lawyer, and service provider from using the service rule to provide 
“bad” notice. Finally, additional penalties may be warranted when a plaintiff 
has provided “bad” service via social media in multiple cases. For example, 
the court may make a finding that a plaintiff has made repeated flawed ser-
 
 354. Stephanie Francis Ward, Our Pleasure to Serve You: More Lawyers Look to Social 
Networking Sites to Notify Defendants, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1, 2011, 8:49 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/our_pleasure_to_serve_lawyers_social_network
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disputes). 
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vice via social media in more than one case and order that the plaintiff be 
precluded from using the service via social media provisions without prior 
approval of court.356 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The way in which we receive information is in a state of rapid change, 
brought about in large part by the growth of social media. These technologi-
cal leaps forward have created the potential to transform some of our most 
traditional legal processes, including the method by which we deliver ser-
vice of process. Our legal systems should be “legally hacked,”357and we 
should capitalize on the opportunities created by technology, especially 
when the use of technology will enable our legal processes to better conform 
to the constitutional principles on which they were built. 
 
 356. For example, states could enact provisions regulating a plaintiff who has been found 
to use repeated bad service in a manner similar to vexatious litigant statutes. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (West 2016). 
 357. See LEGAL HACKERS, supra note 16 (describing “legal hacking” as a cultural refer-
ence to the growing movement to find creative solutions to problems that lie at the intersec-
tion of law and technology). 
